Positive-weight expectation cone 2026-10-14
For an integrable finite-dimensional random vector , let . The displayed convex cone is open relative to . Given a bounded strictly positive , the perturbation , , changes its weighted expectation by , whereFor , : otherwise almost surely. Thus is invertible on , and these perturbations give a neighborhood of every point of the cone. The hyperplane separation theorem consequently gives the alternative: either zero is a strictly positively weighted expectation, or a nonzero direction in has a nonnegative dot product with almost surely and a positive dot product with positive probability. To obtain the latter assertion, test the separating direction with and let .
Positivity assumption Created 2026-09-24 Updated 2026-11-05
Positivity requires every compared treatment to have positive probability at each target covariate value.
Positivity of the limiting Pólya urn proportion Created 2026-10-31 Updated 2026-11-05
Both colour counts tend to infinity almost surely. For example, , and Independent events occur infinitely often by the Borel-Cantelli second lemma, forcing infinitely many blue additions.
The martingale increment formula gives . Conditional orthogonality of later increments and implyOn the squared difference is , so its Conditional probability is at most . Dominated convergence proves zero probability of that endpoint. The symmetric argument for red excludes . No explicit beta law is needed for this proof.
Posterior coin count after exactly one head Created 2026-10-07 Updated 2026-11-05
Let have the positive-integer geometric distribution with success parameter , and conditionally toss independent coins with head probability . Exactly one head has conditional probability . Combining this with the prior by Bayes' theorem gives the displayed posterior with ; its normalization uses . For , the posterior is . It is also a shifted negative binomial distribution, with equal in law to the number of failures before two successes of probability .
Posterior coin selection from repeated tosses Created 2026-10-06 Updated 2026-11-05
If a hidden coin is selected once with prior probability of coin , repeated tosses are independent conditional on that coin. Bayes' theorem weights the prior by each all-heads likelihood. They need not be independent without conditioning on the chosen coin.
Posterior mean from adjacent mixed Poisson probabilities Created 2026-10-14 Updated 2026-11-05
For a mixed Poisson distribution with known exposure , multiply the unnormalized posterior density by and compare its integral with the next probability mass. The factors give the displayed identity whenever . Both mass probabilities have the same exposure . For a future conditionally independent unit-exposure Poisson distribution count, this is also its posterior predictive expected value. It holds for arbitrary proper mixing distributions, with integrals taken against the prior measure when there is no density.
If future Bernoulli random variables are conditionally independent given a shared parameter , with success probability , their all-success conditional probability is . Taking a posterior expectation proves the identity. For , Jensen's inequality and give . For two distinct future trials the posterior covariance is . Thus shared parameter uncertainty can induce positive dependence even when trials are conditionally independent.
Posterior replacement probability after different-colour draws Created 2026-10-18 Updated 2026-10-20
An urn has balls, including of one colour and of the other, with . After a uniform first draw, an independent decision returns that ball with probability ; the second draw is uniform from the remaining contents. Let mean the th draw has the first colour and mean replacement. The two relevant joint probabilities areApplying Bayes' theorem and cancelling the common factors gives the displayed conditional probability. It is independent of and satisfiesTwo different observed colours therefore decrease the posterior probability of replacement: removing the first colour makes the second more likely. The replacement decision must be independent of the first draw for this formula; its marginal probability alone does not specify the model.
Posterior structural-zero probability Created 2026-10-06 Updated 2026-11-05
In a zero-inflated Poisson regression, Bayes' theorem separates structural zeros from susceptible zero counts. A positive count rules out the structural-zero class; a zero raises its posterior probability according to the displayed formula, but usually does not determine class membership with certainty. This same probability supplies the E-step of the EM algorithm for zero-inflated Poisson regression.
After the quantum quench, hold fixed and evolve without an intervening energy measurement. The unitary time evolution isProjection onto the original gives probability amplitude . Squaring its modulus yields the two-level quantum return probabilityTheir sum is one. For , the first minimum of is at , and the return is complete at . At or there is no oscillation, because the initial quantum state is already a final energy eigenstate.
Changing measurement basis reveals the evolving relative quantum phase. Measuring the final energy first instead destroys this quantum coherence between final energy eigenstates in the unconditioned ensemble: its later original-basis return probability is , equal to for this example. That constant differs from the oscillation of the unmeasured pure state. The work protocol and the oscillation protocol therefore use separate preparations.
Postselection Created 2026-10-06 Updated 2026-11-05
Postselection conditions a quantum measurement on a specified outcome. If its branch acts by a linear operator on a normalized input , its probability is , and its normalized output is . This conditional state is defined only when the probability is nonzero. Physically unsuccessful trials are discarded; postselection is not a deterministic implementation of the nonlinear normalization map.
Postselection probability for Kerr-cat preparation Created 2026-10-20 Updated 2026-11-05
Normalize the initial polarization qubit and its analysing wave-plate transformation. For a conditional phase rotation of , a vertical detection has the displayed probability and prepares . At , that outcome has zero probability, explaining the singular normalization of the absent branch.
POVM does not determine the post-measurement state Created 2026-10-14 Updated 2026-11-05
A POVM fixes outcome probabilities, but a quantum instrument additionally fixes the conditional output state. For computational-basis effects , the operators leave the measured eigenstate as output, whereas reset every outcome to . Both have . Thus a specification of effects alone cannot select a unique joint state that retains the measured quantum system.
POVM on the occupied support Created 2026-10-20 Updated 2026-11-05
If every allowed input density operator has support of a positive operator inside a subspace with orthogonal projector , completeness need only equal on that subspace. To define a measurement on the full Hilbert space, one can append when the original operators act only on the subspace. The added outcome has zero probability on supported inputs. The effects form a POVM; the operators themselves additionally specify state updates.
Power of a two-sample rare-event comparison Created 2026-10-14 Updated 2026-11-05
For two independent samples of size with event probabilities , put , , and . The normal approximation to a two-sided level- test has powerFor rare events, independent Poisson distributions approximate the counts. Conditional on their total, the null count allocation is binomial distribution with probability one half; under the alternative the allocation probability is . Averaging its exact rejection probability over the alternative total supplies a discrete power calculation.
// Target: probability-theory.bigb
Predicted local distance difference test Created 2026-10-20 Updated 2026-11-05
An AlphaFold confidence score for local structural accuracy, usually reported on a 0–100 scale. It is not a probability that a complete structure is correct.
Prefix code for a rare geometric success Created 2026-10-14 Updated 2026-10-25
For a success index with geometric distribution of parameter , write , . Encode by ones followed by zero, then encode in exactly bits. This prefix code has length . Since , its expected length is the displayed expression, at most . Thus a very rare success can be communicated in approximately the logarithm of its inverse probability, rather than one bit per trial.
// Target: quantum-theory.bigb
Prior probability Created 2026-09-24 Updated 2026-10-14
Prior probability describes uncertainty before the current observations are incorporated. For a statistical parameter , a prior distribution assigns probabilities to its possible ranges, conditional on background information and a statistical model. A continuous prior density specifies these probabilities through integration:Here the probability density function is relative to Lebesgue measure ; a discrete prior distribution instead uses a probability mass function and sums. Density at one point is not the probability of that point. A nonnegative kernel with infinite total mass is an improper prior, whose use requires a separate check of posterior propriety.
For the coin model in Bayesian statistics, the beta distribution has prior density on . Its mean is and its variance is . It favors moderate heads probabilities without ruling out values near zero or one. For example,The prior curve in Bayesian posterior makes this preference visible; moment matching for a beta prior explains how to choose a beta distribution from a desired mean and variance.
A prior distribution lets earlier evidence or elicited knowledge contribute to statistical inference when the current sample size is limited. It also exposes assumptions that can be checked by prior elicitation and a prior predictive check. Before the same eight heads and two tails, a uniform prior would give posterior mean , compared with under : the observations do not uniquely determine a Bayesian posterior. Even a uniform prior makes a choice of parameter coordinates; its child article explains why changing coordinates can destroy uniformity.
Prisoner's dilemma Created 2026-10-14 Updated 2026-10-20
Two people can each have a clear incentive to choose an outcome that leaves both worse off. The prisoner's dilemma isolates this tension between individual best responses and Pareto efficiency. For example, two partners can each save effort by withholding a promised contribution, yet both would prefer a successful joint project to mutual withholding. The model applies when each person's payoffs really have the ordering below; the names “cooperate” and “defect” alone do not establish a prisoner's dilemma.
In the symmetric two-player normal-form game, each player chooses cooperation or defection simultaneously, without observing the other's current choice. The four payoffs are the mutual-cooperation reward , mutual-defection punishment , sole-defector temptation , and sole-cooperator payoff , with . Defection is a strictly dominant strategy: it beats cooperation against either opposing pure strategy. This definition and the resulting one-shot Nash equilibrium are discussed in Steven Kuhn, Prisoner's Dilemma, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, section 1.
Take the concrete payoffs , , , . Each entry below gives the row player's payoff followed by the column player's payoff:
Prisoner's dilemma: best-response arrows lead to mutual defection despite the gains from mutual cooperation
. Details. For the row player, switching from to improves the payoff from to against , and from to against . The column player has the same comparisons, so is a strictly dominant strategy for each. Even against a mixed strategy choosing with probability , the expected payoff advantage is . Thus cooperation cannot appear with positive probability in a best response, and is the unique one-shot Nash equilibrium, including mixed strategies.
At , a unilateral deviation to lowers the deviator's payoff from to . A joint change to instead raises both payoffs from to : mutual cooperation Pareto dominates mutual defection, making the Nash equilibrium fail Pareto efficiency. A Nash equilibrium tests unilateral deviations, so it need not maximize shared gains. This is the useful lesson: improving the available outcome may require changing incentives, rather than telling each participant to choose a better best response.
The additional inequality says that mutual cooperation gives each player at least as much average payoff as equal-time alternation between the two asymmetric outcomes. It is a further assumption, not a consequence of . Here it holds strictly: , and alternating exploitation gives each player average payoff . This comparison concerns equal-time averages, not every discounted sequence. See Kuhn, section 3, on the additional cardinal-payoff condition.
Probabilistic Banzhaf index 2026-10-25
The probabilistic Banzhaf index averages a player's marginal contribution over all coalitions not containing that player, each given equal weight. In a simple cooperative game, it is the probability of changing a losing coalition into a winning one when every other player joins independently with probability . Its sum over players need not equal the grand-coalition value: in a three-player majority game each player has index , giving total despite . This convention differs from both the raw count of pivotal coalitions and the normalized Banzhaf index.
The name refers to John Banzhaf, whose 1965 paper addresses the mathematical analysis of weighted voting.[ref]

