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Past exam of the philosophy of science supplementary subject of the University of Oxford 2021 5 Solution by
Codex 0 2026-10-25
It is implausible to deny every case of revolutionary theory change, but reasonable to reject the claim that such changes are instantaneous, complete or wholly disconnected from earlier science. Much turns on the strength of the proposed notion of revolution.
Thomas Kuhn challenges a picture of scientific development as the steady addition of true propositions. His contrast between normal science and revolutionary episodes concerns changes in accepted problems, methods and exemplary achievements as well as changes in propositions. A community can revise the framework within which it decides what needs explaining.[ref]
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions by Thomas Kuhn. Introduction, contrasting cumulative development with changes in the commitments governing scientific practice
This is a historical proposal, not the claim that every important discovery is a revolution.The transition from Newtonian mechanics to special relativity supplies a clear physical example of a deep conceptual change. Consider two spatially separated events, and let their differences in one inertial frame be and . A Lorentz transformation givesFor , and , they are not simultaneous in the second inertial frame. By contrast, the Galilean transformation takes , so simultaneity is invariant. The change concerns how time coordinates assigned by separated clocks enter physical measurement, not merely one corrected numerical constant. Albert Einstein begins by defining simultaneity through a clock procedure and then derives the transformation from his postulates.[ref]
On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies by Albert Einstein. sections 1–3, clock synchronization and the transformation equations
One reason to deny revolutions is precisely that the new account retains old achievements. For , and within regimes where relativistic corrections to the relevant measurements are negligible, Newtonian mechanics remains useful. Experimental records, instruments, mathematical methods and many successful predictions cross the transition. That continuity is real. It does not show that the physical interpretation of simultaneity remained unchanged. Numerical approximation in a restricted domain is weaker than identity of conceptual commitments.
A second objection is that major changes emerge gradually. Earlier theories and experiments prepare the transition; different researchers adopt it at different times; its consequences take decades to develop. This undermines a picture of one decisive moment transforming all science. It does not undermine a notion of revolutionary theory change as an extended reorganization of a field. Political revolutions are themselves extended events; the metaphor need not require an instantaneous rupture.
A third objection concerns rational comparison. If a revolution changes standards and meanings, perhaps rival theories cannot be compared at all. But this extreme conclusion is unnecessary. Rival accounts can share instrument records, limited predictions and mathematical limiting relations while differing about their interpretation. Explaining why those records agree in one domain and discriminate theories in another is itself a rational comparison. Conceptual change can make translation partial and difficult without making all evidence inaccessible across the divide.
These qualifications also constrain the historical claim. A local change in one field need not create a universal new worldview. Nor should every anomaly be described as a crisis: normal science routinely works on discrepancies without replacing its framework. Whether an episode is revolutionary should depend on evidence of the extent and character of reorganization, not on a dramatic label attached afterwards.
The defensible conclusion is therefore selective. Denying total, unprepared and irrational breaks may be historically plausible. Denying substantial transformations of fundamental concepts and research standards is much less so. The example of simultaneity shows how continuity of successful calculation can coexist with a change deep enough to merit the name revolution.
Past exam of the philosophy of science supplementary subject of the University of Oxford 2021 3 Solution by
Codex 0 2026-10-25
Change is compatible with natural kinds, provided there is a defensible basis for tracking membership and explaining the changing properties. Requiring every property to remain unchanged would exclude nearly all physical objects. The important distinction is between variation within a kind, a transition out of it, and changes in the population that constitutes it.
Chemical elements offer a relatively sharp case. A carbon atomic nucleus has atomic number six, meaning six protons. Its isotope depends also on its neutron number; the ionization state of a carbon chemical atom can change without changing its chemical element. Temperature, position and velocity can also change. Classifying these objects together is useful because the relevant common constitution supports further inference, not because their entire property lists are identical at every moment.
A nuclear reaction that changes the proton number is different: it can produce a nucleus of another chemical element. This does not refute the original classification. It identifies a process under which membership changes. A theory of natural kinds should permit transformations between kinds rather than require its members to exist forever. The ordinary criterion also has a domain: an arbitrary mixture containing carbon is not itself a single carbon chemical atom.
Water makes a complementary point. A sample can undergo melting or boiling, changing density, rigidity and transport properties while retaining its ordinary chemical identification. The claim must be qualified: a bulk sample contains interacting molecules, and its detailed composition can include dissociation products. It need not consist at every instant exclusively of isolated identical water molecules. Nevertheless, changes of thermodynamic phase are explained through the constitution and organization of the material, rather than by treating every different appearance as a new unrelated substance.
These examples might suggest that some fixed microscopic essence is always required. Species put pressure on that inference. Individuals develop and differ; the distribution of inherited traits can change across generations through natural selection, genetic drift and gene flow. A demand that every member share an unchanging diagnostic appearance would misrepresent this history. It would also make a change in the frequency of one trait automatically create a new species, which is not how the relevant evolutionary processes work.
Homeostatic property cluster theory provides one alternative. Traits can tend to occur together because common development, shared ancestry and interactions within a population sustain their association. The traits need not be universal, and the maintaining processes need not freeze their frequencies. A population can change while retaining enough historical and causal continuity to support useful inference.[ref]
Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa by Richard Boyd. sections 0.0–0.1, the relation between explanatory classification and causally maintained property clusters
This is not a claim that every species concept gives the same boundaries. Reproductive relations, descent and ecological processes can motivate different criteria for different investigations.An objection remains: if both members and their traits change, what prevents a natural kind from becoming a mere convenient label? The answer cannot be resemblance alone or an arbitrary chain of small changes. The proposed grouping must track processes that support reliable explanations and suitably qualified predictions. If the processes maintaining a cluster break down, or a lineage divides into independently evolving populations, continuing to use one label may cease to serve the relevant inquiry. Membership can be uncertain near such transitions without making every central case arbitrary.
There is also no requirement that all natural kinds have the same basis of unity. The atomic number criterion and a historically sustained population answer different scientific questions. Imposing the former structure on every biological grouping would mistake one successful form of classification for a universal metaphysical rule.
Changing properties therefore do not by themselves defeat naturalness. The scientific work lies in identifying which variations a kind tolerates, which transformations end membership, and why its remaining unity supports inference. A classification earns its status through that explanatory achievement, not through the fiction that nature is motionless.
Past exam of the philosophy of science supplementary subject of the University of Oxford 2019 8 Solution by
Codex 0 2026-10-25
A philosophical account of scientific explanation must accommodate causal explanations, but there is no good reason to insist that every explanation be causal or that every one explicitly contain an exceptionless universal law. The issue is what explanatory task an account performs, rather than whether it fits one syntactic template.
The deductive-nomological model explains by deriving a phenomenon from scientific laws and specified circumstances. It illuminates a real feature of physical reasoning: a result is intelligible because it follows from a more general structure, not merely because it has been listed. Yet valid derivability does not automatically supply the direction or relevance of explanation.[ref]
Studies in the Logic of Explanation by Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim. section 3: the deductive schema and adequacy conditions
For a vertical pole of height in a simple geometrical model, a solar elevation gives a shadow length . Algebra permits inference from to , or from to . The equation alone does not decide which quantities are causal inputs. A causal explanation must supplement the relation with how the pole, illumination and surface generate the shadow, and with the changes meant by an intervention. Mere reversal of a calculation is not reversal of a physical mechanism.
Conversely, some explanations appeal to constraints rather than a mechanism producing an event. Twenty-three objects cannot be divided into three equal groups of whole objects because does not divide . The relevant divisibility fact explains an impossibility without describing a cause that prevents each attempted arrangement. Physical applicability still requires that the objects count as indivisible for the task; the arithmetic alone is not a complete theory of the material.
Statistical explanation supplies another limit to a universal deductive requirement. A radioactive decay model gives a hazard rate and the probability of decay within time . It can explain rates and the distribution of waiting times without deductively fixing a particular atom's decay instant. A very unlikely event can still have a recognized mechanism. One must distinguish explaining why an event was possible or had a certain chance from explaining why this event occurred at precisely this time.
A demand for explicitly stated fundamental laws can also be too restrictive in a local mechanistic explanation. Identifying a broken circuit connection and the resulting interruption of current may answer a practical question without deriving the fault from microscopic dynamics. The explanation depends on physical regularities and background assumptions, but dependence is weaker than requiring every law to be displayed in the explanatory argument.
A useful plural account therefore asks whether the explanation identifies relevant dependence, states its domain and answers the actual contrastive question. Causal explanation, mathematical constraints, statistical accounts and explanatory unification can each contribute. This is not permission for arbitrary stories: relevance, independent support and the distinction between prediction and explanation remain constraints on all of them.
Past exam of the philosophy of science supplementary subject of the University of Oxford 2019 6 Solution by
Codex 0 2026-10-25
There are serious philosophical reasons to resist inferring the literal truth of every successful theoretical description. Those reasons support a selective and revisable attitude; they do not establish that none of the unobservable entities investigated by science exists.
Pessimistic induction starts from successful earlier theories whose central ontological claims were later rejected. Their history challenges an unrestricted inference from predictive success to truth. For example, successful descriptions of light transmission were once combined with an account involving a mechanical luminiferous aether. Continued use of some mathematical relations does not show that the proposed medium was real. The force of the objection depends on which part of a theory produced its successful predictions, not on collecting a list of old mistakes.[ref]
A Confutation of Convergent Realism by Larry Laudan. the historical challenge to inferring reference and approximate truth from success
Scientific underdetermination supplies a different challenge. Agreement with available data can leave rival accounts open. If they are empirically equivalent throughout a specified domain, another experiment restricted to that domain cannot discriminate them. This limits what those data establish. It does not show that every actual theoretical disagreement is permanently undecidable, or that equally compatible models must receive equal confidence given all relevant background evidence.
The realist reply emphasizes convergence across independent ways of detecting and manipulating a putative entity. An electron is not supported by one formula alone: accounts of its electric charge, scattering and response to fields connect different apparatuses and phenomena. Such success can be a reason to infer a common physical cause. The no-miracles argument expresses that explanatory motivation, but its force is abductive rather than deductive. It must not assume that only a literally true total theory could produce any success.
Several qualified positions remain defensible. Entity realism places particular weight on robust experimental use of entities without endorsing every theoretical account of them. Structural realism emphasizes specified relations retained across theory change. Neither label removes the need to identify what experimental interventions establish or which interpreted structure survives. Preserving an equation's shape alone is insufficient if the meanings and tested domains have changed.[ref]
Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds? by John Worrall. the discussion of retained structure in the transition from Fresnel to Maxwell
Constructive empiricism offers a genuine alternative: accept a theory's empirical adequacy while withholding belief in its full account of unobservables. The realist must explain why stronger belief is warranted, rather than accuse this stance of denying ordinary laboratory success.
A defensible realism therefore concerns particular well-supported claims, mechanisms and relations, with explicit domains and error allowances. It recognizes historical revision without treating every surviving term as equally secure. Neither universal literal realism nor universal scepticism about entities follows from scientific success or its historical failures.
Past exam of the philosophy of science supplementary subject of the University of Oxford 2019 4 Solution by
Codex 0 2026-10-25
Two problems central to physics concern definite outcomes in quantum measurement and the temporal direction of entropy increase. They expose different gaps between a dynamical description and the phenomena explained; neither can be resolved merely by saying that physics predicts observations successfully.
For the measurement problem, combine a two-state system with an apparatus initially in a ready state. If an ideal unitary operator correlates basis states with distinct pointer states, its linearity givesThe same dynamics that gives reliable correlations therefore gives an entangled final state, rather than a rule choosing one pointer value. The problem is not that the state has failed to predict possible outcomes, but how definite outcomes and their probabilities are related to that state.
Quantum decoherence explains why interaction with an environment suppresses interference in the apparatus's reduced density matrix: its off-diagonal term is multiplied by the inner product of the corresponding environmental states. Near-orthogonal records make this term very small. Tracing out the environment, however, does not by itself select one term in the global superposition. An objective-collapse theory changes the dynamics, while a many-worlds interpretation changes what is required of an outcome. Distinguishable modifications can be tested; interpretations reproducing the same predictions raise additional explanatory and conceptual questions. Decoherence solves a substantial dynamical part of the problem without automatically settling every interpretation.
The second issue is the thermodynamic arrow of time. In a classical model, time reversal in classical mechanics can pair an entropy-increasing trajectory with a reversed entropy-decreasing one. Liouville theorem in Hamiltonian mechanics preserves phase-space volume, so reversible Hamiltonian dynamics does not imply a universal monotonic increase of fine-grained entropy. The Second law of thermodynamics therefore needs a statistical and boundary-condition account, not a deduction from reversibility alone.
Boltzmann entropy assigns larger entropy to a macrostate occupying more compatible phase-space volume. Starting from a suitable low-entropy condition, overwhelmingly more accessible microstates can evolve toward larger macrostates. But an unrestricted typicality argument applied at an arbitrary low-entropy instant generally points toward increasing entropy in both temporal directions. The past hypothesis supplies an asymmetric low-entropy boundary condition in the past; one must still justify the probability measure and the macroscopic description used.
These are genuine partial resolutions rather than interchangeable cures. Decoherence concerns the accessibility of interference and records; a past boundary condition concerns temporal asymmetry in a statistical explanation. A satisfactory account must say which extra assumptions it introduces and which observable consequences follow. Neither problem licenses dismissing successful physics, but both show why a predictive formalism and a complete interpretation of its success are different achievements.
Past exam of the philosophy of science supplementary subject of the University of Oxford 2019 3 Solution by
Codex 0 2026-10-25
A Bayesian confirmation account can dissolve the apparent conflict between logical equivalence and ordinary judgements about relevant evidence. It does so by rejecting an unrestricted positive-instance rule and specifying how the evidence was sampled. Bayes' theorem alone does not guarantee that every white shoe is irrelevant, or that every black raven provides strong support.
Let assert that every raven is black. Its contrapositive is logically equivalent to , so the two descriptions must receive the same conditional probability. The raven paradox arises if every positive instance of a universal statement automatically confirms it: a white nonraven then confirms the contrapositive and hence . The disputed step is that unrestricted confirmation rule, not the logical equivalence.[ref]
Studies in the Logic of Confirmation I by Carl Hempel. section 5: equivalence and the paradoxes of instance confirmation
For background , set , and . For and positive evidence probability,Thus it is the comparison of likelihoods, including the sampling protocol and alternatives, that determines support. Merely rewriting cannot change it.
The finite-population model of raven confirmation makes the intuitive difference quantitative. Fix ravens and nonblack objects. Compare an all-black-ravens hypothesis with the alternative that exactly one raven is nonblack. A uniform draw among nonblack objects that finds a nonraven has likelihood ratio . A uniform draw among ravens that finds a black one has likelihood ratio . If , the former is much nearer one. With equal prior probabilities, and give posterior probabilities approximately and . A tiny amount of confirmation need have no practical significance.
This example is not a theorem about every possible background. Inspecting an object already known to be a white shoe adds no relevant information about its being a nonraven. Other alternatives or selection mechanisms change the likelihoods and can remove or reverse the support. Conditioning only on the observed colour while silently changing how the object was selected would compare different experiments.[ref]
How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens by Branden Fitelson and James Hawthorne. Introduction and the treatment of background-sensitive confirmation; the finite model here is stated separately
The resolution is therefore qualified. A coherent probability model preserves equivalence and explains why superficially parallel observations need carry radically different evidence. It does not select a unique prior or sampling model without scientific judgement. Those remaining modelling questions are limitations of an application, rather than a contradiction in Bayesian inference.
Past exam of the philosophy of science supplementary subject of the University of Oxford 2019 2 Solution by
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Some scientific classifications plausibly identify natural kinds; it does not follow that every useful theoretical category does. A good test asks whether the classification supports reliable inference because of relevant natural structure, rather than treating either practical usefulness or a precise verbal definition as sufficient.
A chemical element illustrates a strong case. Its atomic number fixes nuclear electric charge and constrains the electronic structure of the corresponding neutral atom. The classification thereby supports explanations of recurring chemical properties through quantum mechanics. Isotopes show why the claim must be qualified: equal atomic number does not imply equal mass, nuclear stability or every reaction rate. Whether a division is informative depends on which properties the investigation is trying to predict.
Biological classification need not have the same structure. The biological species concept emphasizes reproductive relations; a phylogenetic species concept emphasizes descent and diagnosable lineages. Hybridization, asexual reproduction and variation within a lineage make a single intrinsic essence an implausible universal criterion. A homeostatic property cluster theory instead asks whether interacting causal processes sustain a cluster of traits that supports induction, without requiring every individual to possess every trait.[ref]
Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa by Richard Boyd. sections 0.0–0.1: explanatory classification and property clusters
These considerations can support realism about biological groupings without making all boundaries equally sharp.There are also classifications whose role is expressly relative to a task. Calling a particle nonrelativistic compares its momentum scale with , or its speed with . An investigator can set a tolerance for neglecting higher terms in an expansion. The boundary then depends partly on the accuracy required; it is not a newly discovered fundamental species of particle. Nevertheless, the approximation is constrained by measurable scales and can be objectively excellent or poor.
This prevents two opposite mistakes. Since a category is chosen for a purpose, it need not be arbitrary: a classification that repeatedly supports independent predictions has a better claim to natural grounding than an arbitrary grouping. Conversely, successful prediction does not uniquely identify the world's one privileged taxonomy. Different scales and explanatory questions may justify overlapping classifications of the same objects.
The defensible conclusion is selective and plural. Treat some kinds as tracking stable mechanisms, structures or historical lineages; assess the evidence for each classification and its intended domain. Retain useful idealized or conventional categories without pretending that every term in a scientific theory names an equally fundamental division of nature.
Past exam of the philosophy of science supplementary subject of the University of Oxford 2019 1 Solution by
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Thomas Kuhn's account is a useful corrective to a history in which scientists simply accumulate observations and replace theories whenever a contrary observation appears. It is less convincing as an exceptionless sequence governing every science. Its compatibility with scientific progress depends on what progress means.
In normal science, a community shares a scientific paradigm: exemplary achievements, accepted instruments and standards for choosing tractable problems. An unexpected result can initially be treated as a problem in the calculation or apparatus. This need not be irrational. A framework that succeeds elsewhere gives investigators reasons to check an instrument before abandoning the framework. Revolutionary theory change reorganizes some of those commitments instead of merely adding another measurement.[ref]
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions by Thomas Kuhn. Introduction: scientific development, established research traditions and the historical role of revolutions
The important contrast is between a descriptive account of how research is organized and a justification of every community's decision. Shared training can explain persistence without making persistence correct. A contrary experiment can expose a failed auxiliary hypothesis, but it can also expose a central error. The Duhem problem rules out an automatic inference from one anomalous reading to one uniquely false theory; it does not authorize indefinitely protecting a theory from independently calibrated tests.
Nor does incommensurability require complete inability to compare. Theories can change the meanings of such quantities as mass while still being compared through specified apparatus readings, limiting calculations and predictions. For instance, the relativistic energy of a free massive particle has the expansionAt , subtracting the rest energy leaves the familiar leading kinetic energy. This is an explicit connection between domains, not an assertion that every concept remained unchanged. It gives a concrete way to retain successful calculations while recognizing the earlier theory's limitations.
Progress measured as closer approach to a single final ontology is therefore not guaranteed by the historical pattern alone. Progress measured through more accurate prediction, solving independently specified problems and understanding why older models work in restricted domains is compatible with substantial conceptual change. These criteria must not be defined merely as whatever a victorious community happens to prefer.
Finally, different specializations can develop competing frameworks simultaneously. A research community need not occupy one uniform stage, and a chronological label alone does not demonstrate a crisis or revolution. The strongest use of Thomas Kuhn's account is consequently comparative: identify what changed in examples, standards and practice, then ask which changes improved scientific capacities. It explains important features of research without supplying a universal historical law or implying that all theory choices are equally good.
Past exam of the philosophy of science supplementary subject of the University of Oxford 2018 8 Solution by
Codex 0 2026-10-25
It is plausible that some claims in current science will be revised, and much stronger to say that every successful part of present science is probably false in every relevant respect. The first is compatible with warranted knowledge. The second needs a substantive argument about the particular claims, their evidence and what “false” means for an approximate or idealized model.
Pessimistic induction points to theories once successful and accepted that were later rejected. Larry Laudan uses historical cases to challenge the inference from predictive success to the truth or successful reference of all theoretical commitments.[ref]
A Confutation of Convergent Realism by Larry Laudan. historical counterexamples to success as a sufficient warrant for reference and approximate truth
The lesson is especially strong against an indiscriminate realism that treats every productive representation as a literal inventory of nature.But a historical list is not automatically a representative statistical sample. One must ask which successes were substantial, which theoretical components generated them, what survived and whether current evidence is comparable. The eventual rejection of an entire ontology does not entail that every measurement, mathematical relation or limited-domain prediction associated with it was worthless. Nor does the chance that at least one claim in a large conjunction is false imply a high error probability for each member separately.
Newtonian mechanics illustrates a useful distinction. It is not a universally exact account across all speeds and gravitational regimes, but controlled low-speed and weak-field approximations can remain extremely accurate. That is an empirical and mathematical claim about a domain, not permission to call any false account approximately true. Approximate truth needs interpretable quantities, a specified regime and some account of relevant error. Structural realism similarly needs preserved physical relations rather than merely a shared abstract notation.
The possibility of error therefore matters. It should discipline extrapolation, encourage independent testing and prevent practical success from being turned into unconditional metaphysical certainty. It does not require abandoning the best-supported models within tested domains. An empiricist can retain justified confidence in empirical adequacy, while a selective scientific realist may defend stronger commitments where evidence and intervention support them. Both positions must distinguish fallible confidence from certainty and carefully bounded reliability from unrestricted literal truth.
Past exam of the philosophy of science supplementary subject of the University of Oxford 2018 7 Solution by
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Scientific underdetermination occurs when the relevant evidence does not select a unique theoretical account. Its force depends on the scope of “the evidence”. Several models can agree with a finite data set while disagreeing about new measurements; a suitable experiment can then discriminate them. The stronger claim of empirical equivalence says that rivals agree on every possible observation within a stated domain, so further evidence of that same kind cannot separate them.
The Duhem problem gives a related but distinct source of ambiguity. If a target theory and auxiliary hypotheses jointly imply an observation , then observing shows , not uniquely . Independent evidence about the apparatus or background assumptions can redistribute support. It does not make the original conjunction logically true; it provides additional information relevant to which revision is warranted.
A finite-data example makes the limits clear. If interpolates observations at distinct , then every polynomial has the same sampled values. Thus polynomial interpolation does not determine a unique prediction outside the sampled points when the degree is unrestricted. A degree bound of would instead give the familiar uniqueness result, so the allowed model class matters. That does not show that every interpolant is equally credible for extrapolation. Smoothness assumptions, independently motivated mechanisms and further measurements can matter. But those extra commitments must be stated rather than smuggled into the claim that the original data uniquely determined a model.
In a probabilistic comparison, Bayes' theorem giveswhen the quantities are defined. Equal likelihoods leave the prior odds unchanged by this evidence. Neither equality nor unequal priors follows merely from both theories being logically compatible with . Thus compatibility, equal fit in a particular measure and full empirical equivalence should not be conflated.
The philosophical significance is a constraint on inference, not a universal proof of irrationality. An empiricist may use it to motivate restraint about hidden structure; a scientific realist may defend further explanatory or intervention-based reasons for belief. A convincing sceptical argument must identify genuine rivals and the relevant equivalence, while a convincing realist reply must explain why its additional virtues track the claims at issue. Scientific knowledge can be selective and fallible even when evidence does not deductively choose a unique complete theory.
Pinned article: Introduction to the OurBigBook Project
Welcome to the OurBigBook Project! Our goal is to create the perfect publishing platform for STEM subjects, and get university-level students to write the best free STEM tutorials ever.
Everyone is welcome to create an account and play with the site: ourbigbook.com/go/register. We belive that students themselves can write amazing tutorials, but teachers are welcome too. You can write about anything you want, it doesn't have to be STEM or even educational. Silly test content is very welcome and you won't be penalized in any way. Just keep it legal!
Intro to OurBigBook
. Source. We have two killer features:
- topics: topics group articles by different users with the same title, e.g. here is the topic for the "Fundamental Theorem of Calculus" ourbigbook.com/go/topic/fundamental-theorem-of-calculusArticles of different users are sorted by upvote within each article page. This feature is a bit like:
- a Wikipedia where each user can have their own version of each article
- a Q&A website like Stack Overflow, where multiple people can give their views on a given topic, and the best ones are sorted by upvote. Except you don't need to wait for someone to ask first, and any topic goes, no matter how narrow or broad
This feature makes it possible for readers to find better explanations of any topic created by other writers. And it allows writers to create an explanation in a place that readers might actually find it.Figure 1. Screenshot of the "Derivative" topic page. View it live at: ourbigbook.com/go/topic/derivativeVideo 2. OurBigBook Web topics demo. Source. - local editing: you can store all your personal knowledge base content locally in a plaintext markup format that can be edited locally and published either:This way you can be sure that even if OurBigBook.com were to go down one day (which we have no plans to do as it is quite cheap to host!), your content will still be perfectly readable as a static site.
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Figure 2. You can publish local OurBigBook lightweight markup files to either OurBigBook.com or as a static website.Figure 3. Visual Studio Code extension installation.Figure 5. . You can also edit articles on the Web editor without installing anything locally. Video 3. Edit locally and publish demo. Source. This shows editing OurBigBook Markup and publishing it using the Visual Studio Code extension. - Infinitely deep tables of contents:
All our software is open source and hosted at: github.com/ourbigbook/ourbigbook
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