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For finite discrete random variables $X,Y,Z$, retaining $Y$ and also observing $Z$ givesEquality means conditional independence of $X$ and $Z$ given $Y$. Both sides average over reports; the additional observation is retained alongside $Y$.^[ref]

A short proof of the original inequality uses Kullback-Leibler divergence:Gibbs inequality makes each term nonnegative, vanishing exactly when $p_{X\mid Y=y}=p_X$: independence for every possible report. Applying this within each $Y=y$ and averaging proves the additional-conditioning inequality.^[ref]

A Bayesian network consists of a Directed acyclic graph $G$ whose nodes are random variables, together with conditional distributions satisfying $p(x)={\prod }_{j}p(x_j\mid x_{{\mathrm{pa}}_G(j)})$. Its Directed acyclic graph encodes conditional independence constraints. For unrestricted binary variables it has ${\sum }_j{2}^{|{\mathrm{pa}}_G(j)|}$ free conditional probabilities. A Directed acyclic graph used this way need not have a causal interpretation.

For a finite measurable partition $(B_j)$ with positive probabilities, and an event $A$ of positive probability,Its beauty is that a model predicting observations from a hidden state can also describe uncertainty about the state after an observation. Each numerator is a joint probability; the denominator, supplied by the law of total probability, makes the answers sum to one. This is a direct consequence of conditional probability, rather than an extra axiom.

Select the coin from law of total probability once, then toss that same coin repeatedly, with conditionally independent tosses given its identity. Let $B$ denote the $3/4$-head coin, initially of prior probability $1/5$. After one head $H$, its posterior probability isThe likelihood of a head is larger under $B$, but $B$ remains less likely than the other coin because its prior probability was smaller. A large likelihood for an observation does not itself imply a large posterior probability for the hypothesis.

After an ordered sequence containing $h$ heads and $t$ tails, its likelihood ratio between the two coins is $(3/2{)}^h(1/2{)}^t$. Bayes' theorem therefore gives posterior oddsEach head multiplies the odds by $3/2$ and each tail by $1/2$. Three heads give posterior probability $27/59$, still below one half; four give $81/145$, above one half. The finite-model update and the distinction between prior probability, likelihood and posterior probability are set out in MIT 18.05, Reading 11: Bayesian Updating with Discrete Priors.

The hidden selection also creates dependence. Each toss has marginal head probability $11/20$, but two heads have joint probability $(4/5)(1/2{)}^2+(1/5)(3/4{)}^2=5/16$, greater than $(11/20{)}^2=121/400$. Their indicator covariance is $1/100$. Seeing a head makes the head-favoring coin more likely, so it also raises the chance of a future head. This is covariance induced by a shared latent variable, despite conditional independence of the tosses given the coin.

Historically, Thomas Bayes's essay on an unknown success probability appeared in 1763 after his death, communicated by Richard Price. Its opening problem asks how observed successes and failures constrain that unknown probability; Price's introductory letter explains the connection to reasoning from experience. That is a more substantial inference problem than simply rearranging today's elementary identity. ^[ref]

A probability distribution is causally minimal for a Directed acyclic graph when it satisfies the global Markov property for a directed acyclic graph for that graph and for no proper subgraph obtained by deleting edges on the same vertex set. It excludes redundant edges without excluding every extra conditional independence.

A coeval binary has components formed at the same time. A population of such binary stars can still have a distribution of system ages. If component masses have independence and the state at age $t$ is determined separately for each component, the states have conditional independence given $t$. If $g(t)$ and $w(t)$ are the conditional probabilities of two states, the unconditional unordered pair fractions are $\mathbb{E}[g(t{)}^2]$ and $2\mathbb{E}[g(t)w(t)]$, not generally products of marginal state fractions.

Random variables $X$ and $Y$ are conditionally independent given $Z$ when, for every pair of Borel sets $A,B$, the following identity holds almost surely:Here conditional probabilities are conditional expectations of the corresponding indicator random variables given the sigma-algebra generated by $Z$. This defines the condition even when $\mathbb{P}(Z=z)=0$. In terms of regular conditional distributions, the conditional joint law is the product of the conditional marginal distributions for almost every conditioning value.

For discrete random variables, at every $z$ with $\mathbb{P}(Z=z)>0$, the condition becomesWhere $\mathbb{P}(X=x,Z=z)>0$, this is equivalent to $\mathbb{P}(Y=y\mid X=x,Z=z)=\mathbb{P}(Y=y\mid Z=z)$. Once $Z$ is known, observing $X$ provides no further information about $Y$.^[ref]

For a worked example, suppose a latent variable $T$ chooses between two environments with $\mathbb{P}(T=0)=\mathbb{P}(T=1)=1/2$. Given $T=t$, take $X,Y$ to be independent and identically distributed with a Bernoulli distribution of parameter $p_t$, where $p_0=0.1$ and $p_1=0.9$. Think of two separate trials run under the same quiet or active environment. Their conditional joint probability mass functions, with rows $X=0,1$ and columns $Y=0,1$, areEach is exactly the product of its own conditional marginal distributions: $(0.9,0.1)$ for $T=0$, and $(0.1,0.9)$ for $T=1$. Thus $X,Y$ are conditionally independent given $T$.

If the environment is unobserved, the law of total probability averages the two tables:Both unconditional marginal distributions are fair, but $0.41\ne 0.5\times 0.5$. The law of total expectation gives

Observing $X=1$ makes the active environment more plausible, so it raises $\mathbb{P}(Y=1\mid X=1)$ to $0.41/0.5=0.82$. Knowing the actual environment removes this source of statistical dependence. The covariance induced by a shared latent variable lemma explains the calculation without listing all the outcomes.

This is why conditional independence is useful in statistical modelling: a model can multiply simple conditional laws and then average over a shared latent variable. The resulting observations can remain statistically dependent. Conditional independence graphs organize such information relations; their interpretation as causes requires additional assumptions from causal inference. Conditioning describes the information available to an observer. It does not, by itself, describe what would happen if an experimenter changed a variable.

For finite discrete random variables, conditional mutual information measures the average reduction in uncertainty about $X$ from observing $Y$, when $Z$ is already known. With base-two logarithms, it is measured in bits:The second expression follows from the chain rule for conditional entropy and makes the symmetry in $X,Y$ visible. Equivalently, compute the mutual information separately in each conditional probability distribution and then average:Here $D$ is the Kullback-Leibler divergence, also computed with base-two logarithms; zero-probability terms contribute zero. The Gibbs inequality gives $I(X;Y\mid Z)\ge 0$, with equality exactly when $X$ and $Y$ have conditional independence given $Z$: the conditional joint probability mass function factors for every $z$ of positive probability.^[ref]

For a fully computed example, take independent random variables $X,Y$ that are fair bits, and let $Z=X\oplus Y$, where $\oplus$ is exclusive or. The complete joint probability distribution has only these four positive entries:

Every pair $(x,y)$ has probability $1/4=p_X(x)p_Y(y)$, so $I(X;Y)=4(1/4){\log }_{2}1=0$. But $p_Z(0)=p_Z(1)=1/2$. Given $Z=0$, the pairs $(0,0),(1,1)$ each have conditional probability $1/2$, while both conditional marginals are fair. ThusGiven $Z=1$, the pairs $(0,1),(1,0)$ give the same calculation. ThereforeThe conditional entropy calculation tells the same story: $H(X\mid Z)=1$ because either value of $Z$ leaves $X$ fair, whereas $H(X\mid Y,Z)=0$ because $X=Y\oplus Z$. Learning the exclusive or does not reveal either bit alone; it reveals whether they agree, so learning one then determines the other.

This example distinguishes conditional independence from ordinary independence. It also disproves the claim that conditioning always reduces mutual information, despite conditioning reduces entropy. There is no general ordering between $I(X;Y\mid Z)$ and $I(X;Y)$: the example above increases it from zero to one, while taking $Y=X$ and $Z=X$ for a fair bit decreases it from one to zero. The chain rule for mutual information explains why both are possible.^[ref]

Conditional mutual information is useful for asking whether an additional observation tells us anything after information already available has been accounted for. Its zero case expresses conditional independence exactly; in a Markov chain, this is the step that turns the chain rule for mutual information into the data processing inequality.

Let $X,Y$ be independent random variables, each with a Bernoulli distribution of parameter $1/2$, and put $S=X+Y$. Unconditionally, the four ordered pairs $(0,0),(0,1),(1,0),(1,1)$ each have probability $1/4$. On the event $S=1$, only $(0,1)$ and $(1,0)$ remain, each with conditional probability $1/2$. ThusKnowing that exactly one trial succeeded makes observing one outcome informative about the other. This violates conditional independence given $S$, even though the original random variables are independent. Given $S=0$ or $S=2$, both variables are constant random variables and are conditionally independent there; that does not repair the failure at $S=1$, an event of positive probability.

The conditional covariance here is $\mathbb{E}[XY\mid S=1]-\mathbb{E}[X\mid S=1]\mathbb{E}[Y\mid S=1]=0-1/4=-1/4$. Both conditional variances are $1/4$, so the conditional correlation coefficient is $-1$: within the selected group, $Y=1-X$. These conclusions follow from restricting a finite sample space, without positing any physical interaction between the trials.

This example and the shared-environment example establish both logical directions: independent random variables need not be conditionally independent, and conditionally independent variables need not be independent. When $S$ is represented as the joint result of two inputs in a causal directed acyclic graph, conditioning on it has the collider structure associated with collider bias. A probability calculation by itself establishes a dependence relation, not a physical causal mechanism or an intervention.

Let $A,B$ be indicator random variables with conditional independence given a latent variable $T$, and suppose $\mathbb{E}[A\mid T]=\mathbb{E}[B\mid T]=g(T)$. ThenFor a short proof, conditional independence gives $\mathbb{E}[AB\mid T]=g(T{)}^2$. The law of total expectation gives $\mathbb{E}[AB]=\mathbb{E}[g(T{)}^2]$ and $\mathbb{E}[A]=\mathbb{E}[B]=\mathbb{E}[g(T)]$. Subtract their product to obtain the claimed variance. Since $0\le g(T)\le 1$, all the required expected values exist.

In the two-environment example of conditional independence, $g(T)$ is $0.1$ or $0.9$ with equal probabilities. Hence $\mathbb{E}[g(T)]=0.5$ and $\mathrm{Var}(g(T))=((0.1-0.5{)}^2+(0.9-0.5{)}^2)/2=0.16$. The two trials have zero conditional covariance in either environment, yet their unconditional covariance is positive because their success probabilities rise and fall together.

More generally, square-integrable conditionally independent random variables satisfyby the law of total covariance. Equal conditional means reduce this to the displayed variance; unequal conditional means need not give a nonnegative covariance. The equal-mean result explains correlated component evolutionary states in a coeval binary population without correlation between initial masses: variation in a shared environment can supply the entire covariance.

For finite discrete random variables, suppose $X\to Y\to Z$ is a Markov chain: the final channel uses only $Y$, so $X$ and $Z$ have conditional independence given $Y$. In terms of the joint probability mass function,and hence $I(X;Z\mid Y)=0$. Then the two data processing inequalities areAll mutual informations here use base-two logarithms. Thus deterministic or randomized processing cannot increase the information shared with an unprocessed variable.^[ref]

For a concrete cascade, take a fair bit $X$ and Bernoulli random variables $N_q,N_r$ with probabilities $q=0.1$, $r=0.2$ of being one. Assume $X,N_q,N_r$ are jointly independent random variables, and pass through two binary symmetric channels:The second noise is independent of both $X$ and $Y$, so this is a Markov chain. Both $Y$ and $Z$ are fair bits. The net exclusive or error is one exactly when one noise flips the bit and the other does not:Using the binary entropy $h_2(t)=-t{\log }_{2}t-(1-t){\log }_2(1-t)$, the three mutual informations are fully determined:All numbers are in bits. The two losses are $I(X;Y\mid Z)\approx 0.3577507789$ and $I(Y;Z\mid X)\approx 0.1048182776$. Thus the cascade retains less information about the original source than either individual channel shares between its own input and output.

With $q=0.1$ fixed and $0\le r\le 1/2$, the effective error is $s=0.1+0.8r$. At $r=0$, $Z=Y$ and $I(X;Z)=I(X;Y)$; at $r=1/2$, $Z$ is independent of the previous variables and $I(X;Z)=I(Y;Z)=0$. The diagram plots these endpoints and the computed $r=0.2$ example.

The data processing inequality is useful for testing what a proposed decoder or data summary could possibly reveal: if its only input is $Y$, even randomized processing cannot provide more mutual information about $X$ than $Y$ already contains. The Markov chain hypothesis matters. In the exclusive or example from conditional mutual information, allowing a processor to use both $Y$ and $Z$ reveals $X$ exactly; that processor has additional input, so the conclusion for processing $Y$ alone does not apply.

The chain rule for mutual information proves both inequalities and identifies their exact gaps. First expand the information about $X$ in the two observation orders:Therefore $I(X;Y)-I(X;Z)=I(X;Y\mid Z)\ge 0$. Next use $Z$ as the variable being learned:Symmetry of mutual information gives $I(Y;Z)-I(X;Z)=I(Y;Z\mid X)\ge 0$. Both signs follow from the nonnegativity of conditional mutual information; the first gap also gives equality in data processing inequality.

Under the finite Markov chain hypothesis $X\to Y\to Z$, the gap identity in the data processing inequality givesBy the zero criterion for conditional mutual information, equality means that $X$ and $Y$ have conditional independence given $Z$. After seeing the processed output, the original observation provides no additional information about $X$. Similarly, equality in the other bound, $I(X;Z)=I(Y;Z)$, holds exactly when $I(Y;Z\mid X)=0$.

Equality does not require retaining every detail of $Y$. Let $X,W$ be independent fair bits, put $Y=(X,W)$, and let the processed output be $Z=X$, the first coordinate of $Y$. This is a Markov chain, andAlso $I(X;Y\mid Z)=H(X\mid X)-H(X\mid X,W)=0$. The output discards the entire unrelated bit $W$, reducing $H(Y)=2$ to $H(Z)=1$, while preserving all mutual information about $X$. This is what makes equality useful for choosing a compact observation that retains all information about the quantity of interest.

A Gamma–Poisson hierarchical model uses $Y_i\mid {\theta }_i\sim \mathrm{Poisson}(t_i{\theta }_i)$, ${\theta }_i\mid b\sim \mathrm{Gamma}(a,b)$, and $b\sim \mathrm{Gamma}(c,r)$, with gamma distributions in shape-rate convention. Conditional independence gives full conditional distributions ${\theta }_i\mid b,y\sim \mathrm{Gamma}(a+y_i,b+t_i)$ and $b\mid \theta ,y\sim \mathrm{Gamma}(c+na,r+{\sum }_i{\theta }_i)$.

A Gaussian Bayesian network specifies a linear normal conditional model at each node of a Bayesian network: $X_j\mid X_{\mathrm{pa}(j)}\sim N({\alpha }_j+{\gamma }_j^T{X}_{\mathrm{pa}(j)},{\sigma }_j^2)$. Independent local errors and an acyclic ordering generate a joint multivariate normal distribution. Positive conditional variances give a nonsingular joint multivariate normal distribution. The graph constrains regression coefficients and hence conditional independence.

Gaussian process classification links latent variables from a Gaussian process to class probabilities. A binary probit regression likelihood is ${\prod }_i\Phi ((2y_i-1)f_i)$ under conditional independence. The posterior distribution of the latent values is not a normal distribution.

A distribution has the global Markov property for a Directed acyclic graph when every D-separation of vertex sets by a conditioning set implies the corresponding conditional independence of their random variables.

Independent assortment means that transmission at different genetic loci has conditional independence given the parental genotype. With fair Mendelian segregation, a parent heterozygous at two genetic loci, $AaBb$, produces $AB,Ab,aB,ab$ gametes with probability $1/4$ each. For example,Here $AB$ labels an allele combination; it does not assert that the two genetic loci lie on the same chromosome.

The physical model is stochastic orientation of different homologous chromosome pairs toward the two poles of the spindle apparatus in meiosis I. One pair's orientation does not determine another's. For two pairs, one division can send $A,B$ together and $a,b$ together; another can send $A,b$ together and $a,B$ together. See The Process of Meiosis (§11.1, Metaphase I and Figure 11.5: random orientation of chromosome pairs).

With $k$ distinguishable homologous chromosome pairs, there are $2^k$ choices of parental homologous chromosome origin for a product at a specified pole, each with probability $2^{-k}$ under this model. For $k=3$, enumerate $MMM,MMP,MPM,MPP,PMM,PMP,PPM,PPP$, where M and P mark parental origins. Whole-pole reversal pairs complementary choices, leaving $2^{k-1}$ unordered partitions for $k\ge 1$. For $k=2$ there are four choices for a specified pole but only the two relative orientations drawn. This counts possible products across meioses, not eight different products of one division when $k=3$. Identical alleles at scored genetic loci can also make different parental-origin choices observationally indistinguishable.

Independent assortment of different chromosome pairs does not imply independence of every pair of genes. Nearby genetic loci on the same chromosome can show genetic linkage. Chromosomal crossover can create new haplotypes, but does not automatically erase genetic linkage. See Laws of Inheritance (§12.3, Law of Independent Assortment and Linked Genes Violate the Law of Independent Assortment). In the ordinary fair two-locus model with parental haplotypes $AB/ab$ and recombination fraction $r$,Thus $r=0$ gives only the two parental haplotypes, while $r=1/2$ gives four equal probabilities. A recombination fraction of $1/2$ alone does not establish that the genetic loci lie on different chromosomes.

A motivating experiment appears in Experiments in Plant Hybridization by Gregor Mendel (§9, “The Reproductive Cells of the Hybrids”). In peas, hybrids for round versus wrinkled seeds and yellow versus green seeds were crossed reciprocally with constant wrinkled-green plants. The readout was visible seed shape and color: hybrid seed parents gave 31 round-yellow, 26 round-green, 27 wrinkled-yellow and 26 wrinkled-green; the reciprocal cross gave 24, 25, 22 and 27.

The apparatus was controlled pollination: opening immature flowers, removing stamens with forceps, and applying selected pollen to the stigma. Two-year trials established constant parental characters; greenhouse pots checked interference from insects in outdoor beds. Reciprocal crosses tested both transmission directions. These procedures are described in Experiments in Plant Hybridization by Gregor Mendel (§§2–3).

With complete dominance at both genetic loci, this test cross makes each phenotype report one hybrid gamete combination. The ideal expected values are $110/4=27.5$ and $98/4=24.5$ per class. The observations support four transmitted combinations, approximately equally frequent. They do not directly image chromosome orientation or prove independence for all genes; failed development and seed germination also limit the inference, as §9 notes.