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Let $Z$ have the fair Bernoulli distribution and set $X_j=Z$ for every $j$. Each coordinate has the same fair probability distribution as in the independent model, but the coordinates are dependent: $\mathbb{P}(X_1=1,X_2=1)=1/2$, whereas the product of the marginal probabilities is $1/4$. Every future sigma-algebra equals $\sigma (Z)$, so the tail sigma-algebra also equals $\sigma (Z)$.

The tail event of infinitely many heads is now exactly $\{Z=1\}$, with probability $1/2$. For the finite-window events $B_{m,r}$ in infinitely many heads as a tail event,The sample space can even be the same full Cartesian product $\{0,1{\}}^{\mathbb{N}}$ in both models: the dependent probability measure assigns mass $1/2$ to each of the all-zero and all-one sequences. Then $A$ is the same literal tail event in both models. Only the probability measure and its independence properties change.

A Bayes factor measures how data change the relative support for two specified statistical models. Write $m_j(D)=p(D\mid H_j)$ for their Bayesian model evidence and define the direction explicitly:For positive finite $m_0(D),m_1(D)$, a value above one favors $H_1$ over $H_0$; a value below one favors $H_0$ over $H_1$. Reversing the comparison gives $B_{01}={\mathrm{BF}}_{01}=1/{\mathrm{BF}}_{10}$, the opposite direction used in some formulas below.

For mutually exclusive, exhaustive $H_0,H_1$ with positive prior probabilities, divide their two Bayes' theorem formulas. Their common data normalizer cancels, leavingThe Bayes factor therefore multiplies prior odds into posterior odds. It is evidence conditional on the specified statistical models and their within-model prior distributions; it is not $\mathbb{P}(H_1\mid D)$. Model prior probabilities supply a separate input.^[ref]

For an original stipulated example, consider ten independent and identically distributed Bernoulli trials, with heads as success. Compare $H_0:p=0.4$ with $H_1:p=0.7$, both fixed before seeing the data. Take $D$ to be one particular ordered sequence containing eight heads and two tails. The likelihood function under either point model is $p^8(1-p{)}^2$, soIf $\mathbb{P}(H_1)=0.1$, the prior odds for $H_1$ against $H_0$ are $1/9$. Hence the posterior odds are $21.9909706/9\approx 2.4434412$, andEqual model prior probabilities would instead give ${\mathrm{BF}}_{10}/(1+{\mathrm{BF}}_{10})\approx 0.956505$. The same Bayes factor can thus accompany different posterior probabilities. These statements condition on the two-model comparison; they do not establish that either statistical model describes a real coin.

Using the heads count $K=8$ instead of the ordered sequence changes the sample space. The binomial distribution assigns it mass $\left(\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{10}{8}\right)p^8(1-p{)}^2$. The same binomial coefficient multiplies both models' Bayesian model evidence and cancels in their Bayes factor. Mixing an ordered-sequence numerator with a count denominator would introduce an erroneous factor of $45$.

Fix the candidate statistical models, their parameter prior distributions, and model prior probabilities before using the current data for this update. The Bayes factor is useful because it separates evidence from model prior odds, but it still depends on the parameter prior distributions. An improper prior has an arbitrary multiplicative normalization: multiplying its kernel by $c$ multiplies its formal marginal likelihood by $c$, even if the within-model posterior distribution is normalizable. Without a separately justified convention, the ordinary Bayes factor is then undefined up to arbitrary constants.^[ref]

Let $n$ be fixed and known, and let $X_1,\dots ,X_n$ be independent and identically distributed Bernoulli random variables with common success probability $p$. Their joint probability mass function, on the binary sample space $\{0,1{\}}^n$, isThere are $\left(\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{n}{t}\right)$ arrangements with $t$ successes, so $T$ has the binomial distribution. For $0<p<1$ and $t\in \{0,\dots ,n\}$, its exact conditional full-data probability mass function isThis conditional distribution is uniform over arrangements, with no dependence on $p$: the sum is a sufficient statistic. ^[ref]

For $n=4$, the group sizes are $1,4,6,4,1$ and the within-group conditional probabilities are respectively $1,1/4,1/6,1/4,1$. For example, $T=2$ leaves exactly $0011,0101,0110,1001,1010,1100$, each with conditional probability $1/6$. At $p=1/4$, each such sequence has unconditional probability $9/256$ and the group has probability $54/256$. At $p=1/2$, these values are $1/16$ and $6/16$; at $p=3/4$ they return to $9/256$ and $54/256$. The conditional weights stay $1/6$ in all three cases.

At the boundary $p=0$, only $T=0$ has positive probability; at $p=1$, only $T=n$ does. Dividing by $P_p(T=t)$ on the other groups would divide by zero. Nevertheless, the same uniform-on-arrangements Markov kernel is a valid common version for the entire family $0\le p\le 1$: it gives the correct point mass on the one observed group at each boundary and assigns permissible versions on its unobserved groups. Define the joint probability mass function there by the original product of the one-trial Bernoulli probability mass functions, or use the limiting convention $0^0=1$ in the compact formula.

The sample mean $T/n$ is an unbiased estimator of $p$ and retains the sufficient statistic because $n$ is known. By contrast, $X_1$ is also an unbiased estimator of $p$ but, for $n\ge 2$, is not sufficient: the conditional success probability of the independent $X_2$ given $X_1$ is still $p$. Thus unbiasedness does not imply sufficiency.

Sufficiency also does not imply completeness of a statistic. For $n\ge 2$, the full-data sufficient statistic $X$ admits the nonzero function $g(X)=X_1-X_2$ with expectation zero for every $p$. Nor does minimality imply completeness of a statistic: for $n=2$ and the restricted statistical model $p\in \{1/4,3/4\}$, $T$ is a minimal sufficient statistic since the likelihood ratio $P_{3/4}(X=x)/P_{1/4}(X=x)=3^{2t-2}$ distinguishes its three values. Yet $g(0)=3,g(1)=-5,g(2)=3$ has expectation $(27-30+3)/16=0$ at both parameter values and is never zero. Changing the parameter family can change completeness of a statistic even while preserving sufficiency.

Events turn Boolean operations into operations on sets. For a die with sample space $U=\{1,2,3,4,5,6\}$, let $A=\{2,4,6\}$ be the event “even outcome” and $B=\{4,5,6\}$ the event “outcome at least four”. At outcome $u$, use the indicator functions $P=1_A(u)$ and $Q=1_B(u)$. ThenThus logical conjunction becomes set intersection, logical disjunction becomes set union, exclusive or becomes symmetric difference, and logical negation becomes the complement of a set within $U$. Outcome four satisfies both events, so inclusive logical disjunction includes it and exclusive or excludes it. If the die is fair, these four events have probabilities $1/3$, $2/3$, $1/3$, and $1/2$, respectively. No assumption of independent events is needed for the set identities; indeed $A$ and $B$ here are not independent, since $1/3\ne (1/2)(1/2)$.

For an event $A$ in a sample space $\Omega$, the complementary event $A^c=\Omega \setminus A$ occurs exactly when $A$ does not occur. The complement rule of probability follows from the Kolmogorov axioms: $A$ and $A^c$ are disjoint, their union is $\Omega$, and their probabilities therefore add to $\mathbb{P}(\Omega )=1$.

This rule is useful when an event is easier to describe through its failure. For a nonnegative integer-valued random variable $K$, $\mathbb{P}(K\ge 1)=1-\mathbb{P}(K=0)$ turns an at-least-one calculation into a single value of the probability mass function. In sampling without replacement, the hypergeometric distribution gives the chance of missing all marked objects, so its complement gives the chance of finding at least one.

Let $X,Y$ be independent random variables, each with a Bernoulli distribution of parameter $1/2$, and put $S=X+Y$. Unconditionally, the four ordered pairs $(0,0),(0,1),(1,0),(1,1)$ each have probability $1/4$. On the event $S=1$, only $(0,1)$ and $(1,0)$ remain, each with conditional probability $1/2$. ThusKnowing that exactly one trial succeeded makes observing one outcome informative about the other. This violates conditional independence given $S$, even though the original random variables are independent. Given $S=0$ or $S=2$, both variables are constant random variables and are conditionally independent there; that does not repair the failure at $S=1$, an event of positive probability.

The conditional covariance here is $\mathbb{E}[XY\mid S=1]-\mathbb{E}[X\mid S=1]\mathbb{E}[Y\mid S=1]=0-1/4=-1/4$. Both conditional variances are $1/4$, so the conditional correlation coefficient is $-1$: within the selected group, $Y=1-X$. These conclusions follow from restricting a finite sample space, without positing any physical interaction between the trials.

This example and the shared-environment example establish both logical directions: independent random variables need not be conditionally independent, and conditionally independent variables need not be independent. When $S$ is represented as the joint result of two inputs in a causal directed acyclic graph, conditioning on it has the collider structure associated with collider bias. A probability calculation by itself establishes a dependence relation, not a physical causal mechanism or an intervention.

A constant random variable takes the same fixed real number $c$ at every outcome in its sample space. Its probability distribution puts mass one at $c$. An almost surely constant random variable may differ on an event of probability zero, while having the same probability distribution.

Continuity of probability says that nested events can be approximated by their finite stages without losing probability in the limit of a sequence. In a probability space $(\Omega ,\mathcal{F},\mathbb{P})$, let $A_n,B_n\in \mathcal{F}$. ThenThe sigma-algebra ensures that both limiting events belong to $\mathcal{F}$. These are continuity from below of a measure and continuity from above of a measure. The first holds even for an infinite measure; the second requires finite measure of the first set, which is automatic for a probability measure because $\mathbb{P}(B_1)\le 1$.^[ref]

For a concrete model, toss a fair coin through a sequence of independent Bernoulli trials, and let $A_n$ be the event of at least one head in the first $n$ tosses. Its complement $B_n=A_n^c$ is the event of $n$ initial tails. On the sample space of infinite head-or-tail sequences,Every finite waiting horizon has positive tail probability, yet the event of waiting forever has probability zero. That intersection is not empty: it contains the all-tails sequence. Thus a zero-probability event need not be impossible as an outcome, and eventual success almost surely does not supply a deterministic deadline. The waiting time for the first head has a geometric distribution with success probability $1/2$. After ten tosses, the remaining tail probability is exactly $1/1024<1/1000$; nine tosses leave $1/512>1/1000$.

A proof outline exposes what makes countable additivity stronger than finite additivity of a set function. For increasing events, put $D_1=A_1$ and $D_n=A_n\setminus A_{n-1}$ for $n\ge 2$. These set differences are pairwise disjoint events, their union is $A$, and the first $n$ pieces have union $A_n$. ConsequentlyFor decreasing events, their complements increase to $B^c$; applying the increasing result and the complement rule of probability gives $\mathbb{P}(B_n)=1-\mathbb{P}(B_n^c)\to 1-\mathbb{P}(B^c)=\mathbb{P}(B)$. The finite-total-mass condition is essential for this subtraction. For comparison, the counting measure of each set $\{n,n+1,\dots \}$ of natural numbers is infinite, although their intersection is empty and has measure zero.

Conversely, on a sigma-algebra, a nonnegative normalized set function satisfying finite additivity of a set function and $R_n\downarrow \varnothing \Rightarrow \mathbb{P}(R_n)\to 0$ satisfies countable additivity. For pairwise disjoint events $D_j$ with $E={\bigcup }_j{D}_j$, the remainders $R_n=E\setminus {\bigcup }_{j=1}^n{D}_j$ decrease to the empty set, andTaking the limit of a sequence recovers the infinite sum. This equivalence explains why continuity of probability is part of the foundations rather than a separate assumption about smooth curves.

One useful application controls infinitely many possible errors. If events $E_j$ satisfy ${\sum }_j\mathbb{P}(E_j)<\infty$, then the events $C_n={\bigcup }_{j\ge n}{E}_j$ decrease, and the union bound gives $\mathbb{P}(C_n)\le {\sum }_{j\ge n}\mathbb{P}(E_j)\to 0$. Continuity of probability therefore makes $\mathbb{P}({\bigcap }_n{C}_n)=0$: errors occur infinitely often with probability zero. This is the Borel-Cantelli first lemma, and it requires no independence. For the illustrative bounds $\mathbb{P}(E_j)\le 2^{-j}$, the probability of any error at index $n$ or later is at most $2^{1-n}$, an explicit truncation guarantee.

The word continuity here concerns nested sets, not the absence of atoms in a probability distribution. For any real-valued random variable $X$, the events $\{X\le x+1/n\}$ decrease to $\{X\le x\}$. Hence its cumulative distribution function is right-continuous even when it has jumps, as for a geometric distribution. The nesting hypothesis matters: an arbitrary sequence of events need not admit either displayed interchange of limit and probability.

An elementary outcome is one member of the sample space. For the ordered two-toss model, $HT$ is one outcome; it contains both toss results. By contrast, “at least one head” is an event containing three outcomes. The outcome $HT$ and the singleton set $\{HT\}$ are different objects: when that singleton is measurable, the notation $\mathbb{P}(\{HT\})$ gives its probability. In the finite model below, every subset is measurable.

The word elementary refers to the chosen level of detail. An outcome can be an ordered pair, a sequence, or an entire realization of a point process. A random variable then extracts a numerical feature of that outcome; the window count of a point process is one example.

For finitely many events, or a countable family with finite sum of individual probabilities, equality in the uncapped union bound holds exactly when every pairwise intersection has probability zero. Equivalently, at most one event occurs almost surely. Pairwise disjoint events give equality, but literal disjointness is stronger than necessary: shared outcomes of probability zero do not change either side. For the capped bound, if the sum exceeds one, equality instead means that the union is an almost sure event; overlap can then have positive probability.

The cap and the disjoint case are both sharp. If the individual probabilities sum to at most one, put the events on separate pieces of a sample space to attain their sum. The twelve-outcome disjoint example does this with two events of probability $1/3$. If the sum exceeds one, a covering union can attain the cap: on the same twelve-outcome sample space, $A=\{1,\dots ,8\}$ and $B=\{5,\dots ,12\}$ have sum $4/3$ and exact union probability one. These are sharpness examples, not an assertion that every overlapping family attains the bound. Positive-probability disjoint events are also not independent events, because their joint probability is zero while the product of their individual probabilities is positive.

Define the head-count random variable $X:\Omega \to \{0,1,2\}$ byThe four elementary outcomes are inputs to this function; its three numerical values are outputs. Each fiber of a function collects all outcomes giving one value. Under the fair independent model, adding the masses in each fiber gives the probability mass functionConsequently the output values are not equally likely, although the inputs are. Using the reduced sample space $\{0,1,2\}$ with these masses gives the same head-count probability distribution; assigning $1/3$ to each value would describe a different model.

A question about a random variable's value becomes an event on the original sample space by taking an inverse image:For a real-valued random variable, this is an event whenever $D$ is a Borel set, by measurability. In this finite example every subset of $\{0,1,2\}$ is allowed. In particular,This is the same “at least one head” event counted above, expressed through an observable.^[ref]

Every event determined by $X$ is a union of complete fibers. There are $2^3=8$ such events, whereas the full power set of $\Omega$ has $2^4=16$. In particular, the first-head event $A=\{HH,HT\}$ is not determined by $X$: it contains $HT$ but excludes $TH$, although both give $X=1$. Choosing an observable makes calculations simpler precisely by forgetting distinctions; the useful choice is one that retains the distinctions the question needs.

A failure-probability budget assigns nonnegative numbers ${\delta }_i$ to a finite or countable family of failure events $F_i$ in a common probability space, with verified bounds $\mathbb{P}(F_i)\le {\delta }_i$. The union bound guarantees that the probability of any failure is at most $\min \{1,{\sum }_i{\delta }_i\}$. By De Morgan's laws and the complement rule of probability, the probability that every requirement succeeds obeysThus ${\sum }_i{\delta }_i\le \delta$ guarantees simultaneous success with probability at least $1-\delta$, even when all failure events depend on the same observations. The numbers ${\delta }_i$ are upper allowances; adding them is not a calculation of the exact failure probability.

For three requirements, give each a failure-probability budget ${\delta }_i=1/20$. The total budget is $3/20$, so simultaneous success has probability at least $17/20$. On a sample space of twenty equally likely outcomes, let $F_1=\{1\}$, $F_2=\{2\}$, and $F_3=\{3\}$. These disjoint events attain the budget and the success bound. If instead all three failure events equal $\{1\}$, their individual probabilities are unchanged, but exact failure has probability $1/20$ and simultaneous success has probability $19/20$. This second model shows how overlap can leave the guarantee conservative.

For $n$ requirements, an equal allocation ${\delta }_i=\delta /n$ is convenient; unequal allocations also work when some requirements are harder to satisfy. For infinitely many requirements indexed by $i\ge 1$, the allocation ${\delta }_i=\delta /2^i$ uses total budget $\delta$ by the geometric series. A fixed positive allowance for every requirement instead gives an infinite sum and no positive simultaneous-success guarantee from the union bound. The individual probability bounds must cover all the failure events being combined: omitting possible failure modes leaves the resulting guarantee about the listed requirements only. The same addition of error allowances underlies the Bonferroni correction in simultaneous hypothesis tests.

Assume the full-data sample space and the range of the statistic $T$ are standard Borel spaces, $T$ is a measurable function, and the statistical model $\{P_{\theta }\}$ is dominated by one common sigma-finite measure $\nu$. Write $f_{\theta }=d{P}_{\theta }/d\nu$ for its densities. Then $T$ is a sufficient statistic if and only if there exist nonnegative measurable functions $g_{\theta }$ and $h$, with $h$ independent of $\theta$, such thatThe statistical parameter can enter $g_{\theta }$ only through $\theta$ and the observed $T(x)$. ^[ref]

For discrete data, take counting measure; for ordinary continuous data, take Lebesgue measure. Independence, identical sampling laws, smooth dependence on $\theta$, and a fixed positive support of a probability distribution are not requirements of this theorem. Parameter-dependent support must nevertheless be included in $f_{\theta }$, usually through an indicator function, and must fit the displayed factorization. The sufficient statistic for a symmetric uniform sample illustrates exactly this: its indicator function depends on the unknown scale through the observed absolute maximum. The null sets in the theorem concern versions of densities; the factors are not generally themselves normalized probability distributions.

For a discrete sample space, the cancellation behind the theorem is particularly transparent. On a group with positive probability, factorization givesConversely, multiply a common conditional probability mass function by $P_{\theta }(T=T(x))$ to obtain the required factorization. For continuous data, a sum over a group is not a density integral over the original Lebesgue measure: the group may have measure zero. Use the regular conditional distribution formulation and the Fisher-Neyman factorization theorem instead of that discrete calculation.

On $\{0,1{\}}^{\mathbb{N}}$, the event of infinitely many heads isIt says that after every index there is another head. For each $n$, the same intersection can start at $m=n$, so $A\in \sigma (X_n,X_{n+1},\dots )$; therefore $A$ is a tail event. This verifies measurability directly using countable unions and intersections.

Assume now that the coordinates are fair independent Bernoulli trials. For fixed $m$, let $B_{m,r}$ be the event of at least one head among $X_m,\dots ,X_{m+r-1}$. Its complement requires $r$ tails, soThe last equality follows from continuity of probability. Now $A={\bigcap }_{m\ge 1}{B}_m$, a countable intersection of almost sure events, and hence $\mathbb{P}(A)=1$. This determines which of the two possibilities in Kolmogorov's zero–one law occurs. Equivalently, the Borel-Cantelli second lemma applies to the independent events $\{X_j=1\}$.

Nevertheless, no finite prefix certifies membership in $A$: every finite record can be extended by all tails or by alternating heads and tails. Under the fair independent model, conditioning on any exact finite prefix leaves $\mathbb{P}(A)=1$, since $A$ is independent of the initial sigma-algebra. The excluded all-tails continuation has probability zero, but remains a possible member of the sample space. Logical determination by a finite record and a conclusion holding almost surely are different statements.

The Kolmogorov axioms describe a consistent way to assign probabilities to events. Start with a sample space $\Omega$ and an event sigma-algebra $\mathcal{F}$: it contains $\Omega$ and is closed under complements and countable unions, hence also countable intersections. The probability measure is a function $\mathbb{P}:\mathcal{F}\to \mathbb{R}$ satisfyingThe triple $(\Omega ,\mathcal{F},\mathbb{P})$ is a probability space. The third axiom is countable additivity; the infinite series means the limit of a sequence of nonnegative partial sums. It applies to pairwise disjoint events, not to overlapping events and not to arbitrary uncountable unions.^[ref]

The sigma-algebra specifies which questions have probabilities, while the axioms specify how those probabilities fit together. For a finite sample space one can take the entire power set; a continuous model commonly uses a Borel sigma-algebra. Nonnegativity and normalization do not require equally likely outcomes or independence: those are additional modelling choices.

For an exact six-outcome model, take $\Omega =\{1,2,3,4,5,6\}$, $\mathcal{F}=\mathcal{P}(\Omega )$, and assign $\mathbb{P}(\{k\})=k/21$. The total is one because $1+2+3+4+5+6=21$. Define the probability of an event by summing the weights of its outcomes. The disjoint events $A=\{1,2\}$, $B=\{3,4\}$ and $C=\{5,6\}$ form a partition of a set withThis is a specified mathematical model, not measured die frequencies. The figure makes probability literal area: each region has the same height and a width proportional to its assigned mass. Regrouping disjoint events preserves their total area.

Several familiar rules are consequences, not further axioms. Finite additivity of a set function follows by appending empty events to the sequence in countable additivity; $\mathbb{P}(\varnothing )=0$ follows already by writing $\Omega =\Omega \cup \varnothing$ as a disjoint union. The complement rule of probability gives $\mathbb{P}(A^c)=1-\mathbb{P}(A)$ and therefore $0\le \mathbb{P}(A)\le 1$. Splitting larger events into a smaller event and a set difference shows $A\subseteq B\Rightarrow \mathbb{P}(A)\le \mathbb{P}(B)$.

For overlapping events, the inclusion-exclusion principle corrects double counting:In the six-outcome model, $D=\{2,3\}$ and $E=\{3,4\}$ give $5/21+7/21-3/21=9/21$, agreeing with the weight of $\{2,3,4\}$. This decomposition is useful because a complicated event can be assembled from simpler questions with known probabilities.

On a finite sample space, a family of pairwise disjoint events has only finitely many nonempty members, so finite additivity of a set function already handles every countable disjoint union. On an infinite sample space, the countable axiom additionally controls what is left beyond every finite stage. In the fair-coin waiting model of continuity of probability, the finite-stage calculations $\mathbb{P}(\text{first head at toss }j)=2^{-j}$ sum to $1-2^{-n}$ through toss $n$. Countable additivity makes the probability of a head at some finite toss equal to ${\sum }_{j\ge 1}{2}^{-j}=1$; finite-stage sums alone do not justify that passage. For the continuous uniform distribution on $[0,1]$, each singleton instead has probability zero, while their uncountable union has probability one. Countable, rather than unrestricted, additivity accommodates both models.

Historically, Kolmogorov's 1933 book Grundbegriffe der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung established the influential axiomatic framework connecting probability theory with measure theory. The three conditions above are the modern presentation on a sigma-algebra. Shafer and Vovk's historical study explains that the original presentation began with finite additivity on an algebra of sets and added continuity for decreasing events with empty intersection, which supplies the countable extension.^[ref]

Let $(B_i)$ be a countable measurable partition of the sample space, with positive probabilities. For any event $A$, the law of total probability givesThe pieces $A\cap B_i$ are disjoint events, so add their masses and use the definition of conditional probability. Zero-mass partition pieces can be omitted without changing the answer.

For the coin selection in probability, let $B$ mean the $3/4$-head coin was selected and let $H$ mean the first toss was heads. Then $\mathbb{P}(H)=\mathbb{P}(H\mid B)\mathbb{P}(B)+\mathbb{P}(H\mid B^c)\mathbb{P}(B^c)=11/20$. Each conditional answer describes one possible hidden situation; its weight describes how often that situation occurs under the model. This decomposition is useful whenever a simple conditional model sits behind a more complicated marginal probability distribution.

The law of total probability combines local conditional probabilities into one overall probability. The measurable partition must cover the sample space with pairwise disjoint events: every elementary outcome belongs to exactly one part. Its probabilities are the weights of a weighted mean, and they sum to one.^[ref]

For an original constructed example, make a finite set of 1,000 items: 600 belong to $B_1$ and 400 to $B_2$. Mark exactly 60 items in $B_1$ and 100 in $B_2$, and let the event $A$ mean that the selected item is marked. Select an item using the uniform distribution on a finite set. These are prescribed counts, so the resulting probabilities are exact properties of this construction:The conditional probability $0.1$ uses only the 600 items in $B_1$ as its denominator. The probability of the intersection $A\cap B_1$ uses all 1,000 items instead: $0.6\times 0.1=0.06$. Similarly, $\mathbb{P}(A\cap B_2)=0.4\times 0.25=0.10$. Adding the two disjoint events gives

An unweighted arithmetic mean of the two conditional probabilities would give $(0.1+0.25)/2=0.175$. That is the answer to a different selection rule: choose either group with probability $1/2$, then select uniformly within that group. Here the first group contains more items, so selecting uniformly among all items gives it weight $0.6$. In fact, if its weight were $w$, the overall probability would be $0.1w+0.25(1-w)=0.25-0.15w$. Moving the weight from $1/2$ to $0.6$ lowers the result by $0.015$, explaining exactly why $0.175$ is too large for the original model.

The same construction is a mixture distribution: first select a group with its mixture weight, then select an item within that group. Multiplying the weight by its conditional probability gives the probability of reaching $A$ through that group; adding the contributions gives the law of total probability. For example, an item in $B_1$ has selection probability $0.6/600=1/1000$, and an item in $B_2$ has selection probability $0.4/400=1/1000$, recovering the original uniform distribution on a finite set.

No assumption of independent events is needed. In this construction $\mathbb{P}(A\mid B_1)=0.1$ differs from $\mathbb{P}(A)=0.16$, so $A$ and $B_1$ are not independent events. Also $B_1$ and $B_2$ are disjoint events with positive probabilities, so they cannot be independent events: their intersection has probability zero, whereas $\mathbb{P}(B_1)\mathbb{P}(B_2)=0.24$. The measurable partition supplies exclusive alternatives, not an independence assumption.

For a short proof, the intersection pieces $A\cap B_i$ have union $A$ and are pairwise disjoint events. Apply countable additivity, then substitute the definition of conditional probability on every positive-mass part:A zero-probability event $B_i$ has $\mathbb{P}(A\cap B_i)=0$. Omit it: writing $\mathbb{P}(A\mid B_i)$ would divide by zero. Countability ensures that the union of the omitted zero-probability events also has probability zero. Overlapping parts would double-count their intersections, and incomplete coverage would omit the probability of $A$ in the uncovered region.^[ref]

Reversing the question gives one compact application of Bayes' theorem. Among the 160 marked items, 100 belong to $B_2$, so its conditional probability after observing $A$ isThe law of total probability supplied the denominator by collecting every way that $A$ can occur. Its usefulness lies in choosing a measurable partition where the conditional probabilities are simple, then combining them without losing the relative sizes of the alternatives.

A probability distribution assigns total probability one to its sample space. For a nonnegative probability density function this means that its integral over the full domain equals one; for a probability mass function the sum of its masses equals one. A nonnegative integrable function with positive finite integral can be divided by that integral to normalize it. A negative function cannot be a probability density function even if a formal manipulation purports to normalize it.

Pairwise independent events describe a subtle kind of uncertainty: learning that one event occurred leaves each other event's probability unchanged, yet learning that two occurred can reveal a third completely. Checking every pair therefore answers a weaker question than checking the whole collection. The parity construction of pairwise independent bits makes this distinction visible with just four equally likely outcomes.

A family of events $A_i$ is pairwise independent whenIf $\mathbb{P}(A_j)>0$, this is equivalent to the conditional probability identity $\mathbb{P}(A_i\mid A_j)=\mathbb{P}(A_i)$. The product definition also handles events of probability zero. Independent events, meaning mutually independent events, require the same product rule for every finite subfamily, including triples. For three events, the three pair equations and the triple equation are four separate requirements. ^[ref].

For a worked example, take independent fair bits $U,V$: the sample space is $\{00,01,10,11\}$ with probability $1/4$ per outcome. Set $X=U$, $Y=V$, and $Z=U\oplus V$, using exclusive or, which is one precisely when its inputs differ. The events $A=\{X=1\}$, $B=\{Y=1\}$, and $C=\{Z=1\}$ each contain two outcomes. Their pair intersections areThus each event has probability $1/2$ and each pair intersection has probability $1/4=(1/2{)}^2$: these are pairwise independent events. But $X=Y=1$ forces $Z=0$, soThe three are not independent events. This is the complementary-third-event version of the two-toss example in Tsitsiklis and Jaillet, MIT Introduction to Probability, Lecture 3, slides 7–8.

Another useful diagnostic preserves a special common-intersection case. Suppose three events have common probability $s$ and every pair and triple intersect in the same event, of probability $q$. Pairwise independence requires $q=s^2$, while mutual independence additionally requires $q=s^3$. Both hold only for $s=0$ or $s=1$. For a concrete nontrivial instance, assign probability $1/4$ to each of four outcomes, let all three events contain the first outcome, and give each event one different additional outcome. Then $s=1/2$ and $q=1/4$: the pair equations hold, while the triple equation fails. Unlike the exclusive or example above, this triple intersection is nonempty.

A family of disjoint events whose union is the sample space. For the countable law of total probability and law of total expectation, use a finite or countably infinite family. Conditioning formulas sum only positive-probability parts, or interpret zero-probability contributions as zero without assigning a conditional expectation there.

For $\mathbb{P}(B)>0$, the conditional probability is $\mathbb{P}(A\mid B)=\mathbb{P}(A\cap B)/\mathbb{P}(B)$. Since the events $B_i$ partition the sample space, their intersections with $A$ are disjoint and exhaust $A$. The law of total probability therefore gives $\mathbb{P}(A)={\sum }_j\mathbb{P}(A\mid B_j)\mathbb{P}(B_j)$. Substituting this and $\mathbb{P}(A\cap B_i)=\mathbb{P}(A\mid B_i)\mathbb{P}(B_i)$ into the definition proves Bayes' theorem:The denominator is positive by the given hypothesis on $A$.