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Bayesian credibility estimates a risk's conditional mean by its Bayesian posterior expected value under squared-error loss. When that posterior mean is an affine combination of exposure-weighted individual experience and a prior mean, the coefficient of the experience is its credibility factor. Exact Bayesian credibility is distinct from merely selecting the best affine estimator when the true posterior mean is nonlinear.

A Bayesian deviance is minus twice the log-likelihood, with any chosen additive data-only constant held consistent across the models being compared. Its Bayesian posterior expectation measures average fit. In the deviance information criterion, evaluating it at a parameter's posterior mean also enters the effective complexity penalty. This likelihood-based convention differs by a data-only constant from a saturated-model exponential-family deviance when a common saturated model exists.

The Bayesian model evidence is the prior predictive distribution evaluated at the data $D$. For a statistical model $H_j$ with a normalized prior density ${\pi }_j$, its marginal likelihood isThis is an expected value of the likelihood function under the prior distribution; for discrete statistical parameters, replace the integral by a sum. For continuous observations, $m_j(D)$ is a probability density function value with respect to a specified data reference measure, rather than a probability of one exact observation. Comparisons must use the same data and reference measure. The same $m_j(D)$ normalizes the within-model Bayesian posterior and supplies the between-model comparison in a Bayes factor.^[ref]

A normalized prior distribution makes the Bayesian model evidence an average, so it cannot exceed the largest likelihood function value on its support. A broad prior distribution can assign little mass to values that predict the data well, even when one value gives an excellent fit. The worked uniform-alternative binomial Bayes factor below makes the difference between averaging and maximum likelihood estimation explicit.

The Bayesian posterior is the conditional probability distribution of an unknown statistical parameter after observing data. Suppose a continuous prior distribution has prior density $\pi (\theta )$ relative to Lebesgue measure $d\theta$, and $p(d\mid \theta )$ is the sampling probability mass function or probability density function of the observed data $d$ in the statistical model. Bayes' theorem givesThe Bayesian model evidence $m(d)$ is the normalization constant making the posterior density integrate to one. The strict positive, finite condition is essential: a zero or infinite normalizer does not define this posterior distribution, even if the unnormalized expression can be written down. Other reference measures give the corresponding density formula; discrete parameter values replace the integral by a sum. The posterior propriety article gives examples where normalization fails.

With $d$ fixed, $L(\theta ;d)=p(d\mid \theta )$ is a likelihood function of $\theta$. Its normalization as a sampling distribution is over possible data, not over parameter values. In particular, a likelihood function is not a probability density function for $\Theta$ and need not integrate to one over $\theta$. The prior density supplies the probability weighting, and the Bayesian model evidence normalizes their product. This distinction prevents a tempting mistake: reversing the conditioning merely by exchanging the words “data” and “parameter”.

For eight heads among ten conditionally independent Bernoulli trials, take the observed data to be the heads count $D=8$. Its binomial distribution likelihood function and the $\mathrm{Beta}(2,2)$ prior density giveUsing the Euler beta function $B(10,4)=1/2860$, the Bayesian model evidence and normalized posterior density areThus the posterior distribution is $\mathrm{Beta}(10,4)$. If the data are instead one particular ordered sequence with eight heads and two tails, its likelihood function omits the factor 45 and its Bayesian model evidence becomes $3/1430$. The factor cancels in Bayes' theorem, leaving the same posterior distribution; these two data descriptions have different sampling probabilities but identical information about $\theta$ here.

The prior density and posterior density use the left axis and each integrate to one. The dashed likelihood function uses the right axis and is divided by its maximum solely to compare its shape; it is not a parameter probability density function. The likelihood function peaks at $8/10$, while the posterior mode is $9/12=3/4$ and the posterior mean is $5/7$. Multiplying by the prior density shifts the preferred values toward one half while preserving a range of possibilities.

The resulting posterior variance is $10\cdot 4/(14^2\cdot 15)=2/147\approx 0.0136054$, compared with prior variance $1/20$. In this example the update reduces uncertainty. The posterior predictive probability of heads on the next conditionally independent toss is $\mathbb{E}[\Theta \mid D=8]=5/7$, and the credible interval above reports a 95% range. These are summaries of the same posterior distribution, rather than competing estimates of one density peak.

Bayesian statistics expresses uncertainty about an unknown statistical parameter through a probability distribution, then uses Bayes' theorem to update it after observing data. The prior distribution describes uncertainty before the current observations; the likelihood function describes how the statistical model generates those observations at each parameter value; the posterior distribution describes uncertainty conditional on the observations and that model. A physical parameter can have one fixed value while its value remains uncertain to us. Assigning it a probability distribution represents that uncertainty under the chosen model, rather than requiring the physical parameter to change randomly between measurements.

For example, suppose ten Bernoulli trials are independent conditional on an unknown heads probability $\theta$, with a beta distribution prior $\mathrm{Beta}(2,2)$. Eight heads and two tails give the posterior distribution $\mathrm{Beta}(10,4)$ by Beta-binomial conjugacy. Its posterior mean is $10/14=5/7\approx 0.714286$, between the prior mean $1/2$ and observed binomial proportion $8/10$. The Bayesian posterior below computes the whole update, and the credible interval below summarizes its remaining uncertainty. The conjugate update is explained in MIT 18.05, Reading 15: beta and normal conjugate priors.

The useful feature is that one posterior distribution supports several questions: a posterior mean estimates a value, a credible interval reports a range, and a posterior predictive distribution predicts a future observation while averaging over parameter uncertainty. With conditionally independent new data, today's posterior distribution can become tomorrow's prior distribution. These conclusions remain conditional on the statistical model and prior distribution; a precise update does not establish that either assumption fits the experiment.

A historical starting point is Thomas Bayes's essay in the 1763 volume of the Royal Society's Philosophical Transactions, communicated after his death by Richard Price. Its opening problem asks for uncertainty about an unknown event probability given observed successes and failures: the same direction of reasoning illustrated by the coin example. See Bayes and Price, An Essay towards solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances, opening letter and problem.

BUGS specifies a probabilistic model through stochastic nodes, deterministic nodes and observed data, then uses Markov chain Monte Carlo to simulate its Bayesian posterior. Its normal sampling notation uses a precision parameter rather than a variance, and its gamma notation uses shape and rate.

A credibility estimate combines a risk's individual experience with population information. In the basic equal-exposure form, the credibility factor $Z$ weights the observed sample mean, while $1-Z$ weights a prior or collective expected value. The Bühlmann credibility premium is the best affine estimate under mean squared error; an exact Bayesian posterior mean can also have this form, as in the natural conjugate credibility identity.

For independent observations $y_s\sim N(\beta +d_s,V_s)$, put $a_s=V_s^{-1}$, $S={\sum }_s{a}_s$, $r_s=y_s-d_s$, $\bar{r}=S^{-1}{\sum }_s{a}_s{r}_s$ and $Q={\sum }_s{a}_s(r_s-\bar{r}{)}^2$. Integrating the likelihood function against a flat improper prior on $\beta$ gives, up to the arbitrary prior constant,Indeed ${\sum }_s{a}_s(r_s-\beta {)}^2=Q+S(\beta -\bar{r}{)}^2$, and the remaining one-dimensional Gaussian integral is $\sqrt{2\pi /S}$. The conditional Bayesian posterior of $\beta$ is $N(\bar{r},S^{-1})$.

For inverse-gamma distribution observations of known shape $k$ and scale $\Theta$, their likelihood function in $\Theta$ is proportional to ${\Theta }^{nk}\exp (-\Theta {\sum }_i{x}_i^{-1})$. A shape-$\alpha$, rate-$\lambda$ gamma distribution conjugate prior therefore gives the displayed Bayesian posterior. The Bayes estimator under squared error loss of the conditional claim expected value $\Theta /(k-1)$ is $(\alpha +nk)/[(k-1)(\lambda +{\sum }_i{x}_i^{-1})]$. It depends on reciprocals, rather than the sample mean of the claims.

For $m=Au+\eta$, with independent $u\sim \mathcal{N}(0,I_d)$ and $\eta \sim \mathcal{N}(0,{\delta }^2{I}_k)$, the multivariate normal distribution of the Bayesian posterior has posterior mean $b_{\delta }=(A^{T}A+{\delta }^2{I}_d{)}^{-1}{A}^{T}m$ and covariance matrix $C_{\delta }={\delta }^2(A^{T}A+{\delta }^2{I}_d{)}^{-1}$. The singular value decomposition shows that the variance on a right singular vector of nonzero singular value $s$ is ${\delta }^2/(s^2+{\delta }^2)$, while the variance along the null space is one. Thus, for fixed data, the mean tends to the minimum-norm least-squares solution and the covariance tends to the orthogonal projection onto the null space. Unobserved components retain their prior distribution even as the noise vanishes.

If $f$ is a measurable function into a separable Banach space and has finite second moments under probability measures $\mu ,{\mu }^{\prime }$, then their Bochner integral expected values satisfyHere the Hellinger distance includes the factor $1/2$ in its square. For a proof, use $\nu =(\mu +{\mu }^{\prime })/2$, $p=d\mu /d\nu$, and $q=d{\mu }^{\prime }/d\nu$. Apply the norm bound for a Bochner integral and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to $f(p-q)=f(\sqrt{p}-\sqrt{q})(\sqrt{p}+\sqrt{q})$, then use $(\sqrt{p}+\sqrt{q}{)}^2\le 2(p+q)$. This explains why stability of a Bayesian posterior in Hellinger distance controls posterior expected values when the relevant second moments remain bounded.

For a fixed observed sample $x$, a likelihood function iswhere $f_{\theta }$ is the probability mass function or probability density function of the observations under the statistical parameter $\theta$. All densities must be defined relative to the same parameter-independent dominating measure. The sample is fixed; the parameter is the function's argument. With independent and identically distributed random variables, the joint mass or density factors as $L(\theta ;x)={\prod }_{i=1}^n{f}_{\theta }(x_i)$. This definition and the distinction between sampling probability and parameter uncertainty are explained in MIT 18.05, Reading 10b, sections 3 and 3.2.

For an observed ordered sequence of ten independent Bernoulli trials containing eight successes and two failures, each success contributes $p$ and each failure contributes $1-p$, givingIf the observation is instead only the total count $K=8$, its binomial distribution probability mass function sums over the $\left(\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{10}{8}\right)=45$ possible ordered sequences:The raw heights differ: at $p=0.8$ they are approximately $0.0067108864$ and $0.301989888$. Their maximum-likelihood estimates are identical. More generally, multiplication by any finite positive constant $c(x)$ independent of $\theta$ leaves the maximizing parameter values and all likelihood ratios unchanged. Multiplication by a parameter-dependent factor can change the MLE; dropping such a factor is not justified. Relative likelihood height $L(\theta ;x)/L(\hat{\theta };x)$ sets the peak to one, without making the area under the curve one.

Normalization of $f_{\theta }$ is over possible data values for each fixed parameter. It imposes no requirement that ${\int }_{\Theta }L(\theta ;x)d\theta =1$. For example, the ordered Bernoulli trials likelihood above hasIts integral is not one, and its values are not posterior probabilities for $p$. When the Bayesian posterior is defined, Bayes' theorem multiplies the likelihood by a prior density and normalizes that product. Choosing to normalize a likelihood function alone is an additional choice, such as using a uniform prior in those parameter coordinates, rather than part of the definition of likelihood.

For observations with a probability density function, the probability of an exact sample point is zero. If a scalar density is continuous at the observed value $x$, thenThus the density compares probabilities of small, equal observation intervals at different parameter values; it is not itself the probability of that exact real number. The equal-width factor is independent of the parameter. This gives visual intuition for density likelihoods, as in MIT 18.05, Reading 10b, section 4. The normal distribution example in maximum-likelihood estimator makes the comparison explicit. If only rounded intervals are recorded, their integrated probabilities give the exact observation likelihood; using midpoint densities is an approximation.

Partial pooling estimates related local parameters jointly through shared hyperparameters. Each local Bayesian posterior balances its own likelihood function against a group prior distribution, with stronger shrinkage when its data are weak or the group variation is small. It lies between forcing all local parameters to be equal and estimating them independently. Random-effects meta-analysis is an important application.

Put $q={\cos }^2(\pi /8)=(2+\sqrt{2})/4$ and $1-q={\sin }^2(\pi /8)$. In the computational basis, input $|a⟩$ has outcome probabilities $(q,1-q)$, while $|b⟩$ has $(1-q,q)$. The marginal outcomes are equally likely; the Bayesian posterior probabilities areGuess $a$ after zero and $b$ after one. Each guess is correct with probability $q\simeq 0.853553$ and wrong with probability $1-q\simeq 0.146447$. Neither outcome is certain evidence for one input.

For a real state $|{\psi }_{\theta }⟩=\cos \theta |0⟩+\sin \theta |1⟩$, the Born rule in the Hadamard basis gives $P(\pm \mid \theta )=(1\pm \sin 2\theta )/2$. Both angles $\pi /8$ and $3\pi /8$ have $\sin 2\theta =1/\sqrt{2}$. Thus both preparations give $P(+)=q$ and $P(-)=1-q$. By Bayes' theorem, either outcome leaves the two input hypotheses equally likely. The biased outcome frequencies carry no information about which state was prepared; the best success probability with this measurement is $1/2$.

A beta distribution is a convenient prior for a probability $p\in (0,1)$ and is conjugate to the binomial distribution of the death count. Match its mean $m=0.05$ and variance $v=0.02^2=0.0004$. For $p\sim \mathrm{Beta}(\alpha ,\beta )$,The moment matching for a beta prior formula givesConditional on $p$, use $D\sim \mathrm{Binomial}(90,p)$ and the observed count $D=9$. Multiplying its likelihood $p^9(1-p{)}^{81}$ by the prior density gives the Bayesian posterior through Beta-binomial conjugacy:Under squared-error loss, take its posterior mean as the point estimate. A 95% equal-tail credible interval is given by its 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles. Numerically,Matching two moments does not uniquely determine a prior distribution; the beta family is a justified convenient choice, not a conclusion forced by those moments. Its transfer to this hospital presumes that the historical between-hospital distribution is relevant to the present risk and case mix.

In the Bühlmann model, one policy has a random risk parameter $\Theta$. Conditional on $\Theta$, its annual observations $X_i$ are independent and identically distributed random variables, with mean $m(\Theta )$ and variance $v(\Theta )$. Put $m_0=\mathbb{E}[m(\Theta )]$, let $v=\mathbb{E}[v(\Theta )]$ be the expected process variance, and let $a=\mathrm{Var}(m(\Theta ))$ be the variance of hypothetical means. Assume the required second moments are finite.

The Bühlmann credibility premium is the best affine estimate of $m(\Theta )$ under mean squared error. After choosing the intercept to make the estimate unbiased, write it as $m_0+{\sum }_{i=1}^n{b}_i(X_i-m_0)$. If $B={\sum }_i{b}_i$, the law of total variance and conditional independence give its errorFor fixed $B$, the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality minimizes the last sum at $b_i=B/n$. Differentiating $a(1-B{)}^2+v{B}^2/n$ gives $B=na/(na+v)$. Thus the credibility factor and credibility premium areThe ratio form assumes $a>0$; when $a=0$ and $v>0$, the conditional mean is constant and $Z=0$. Predicting $X_{n+1}$ rather than its conditional mean adds the constant $v$ to the error and leaves the optimal affine estimate unchanged.

Here the latent intensity has a Pareto distribution with shape three and lower bound one. For $r<3$, its moments are $\mathbb{E}[{\Theta }^r]=3{\int }_1^{\infty }{\theta }^{r-4}d\theta =3/(3-r)$. ConsequentlyThe equality for $v$ uses the Poisson distribution conditional variance $v(\Theta )=\Theta$. There are two years of experience, so $Z=1/2$ and the observed sample mean is $k/2$. The Poisson credibility with a shape-three Pareto intensity is thereforeIn particular it equals $2$ when $k=5$.

For the exact Bayesian credibility estimate, the total count conditional on $\Theta =\theta$ has Poisson distribution of mean $2\theta$. Multiplication of its likelihood by the prior distribution density gives a Bayesian posterior density proportional to ${\theta }^{k-4}{e}^{-2\theta }$ on $\theta >1$. At $k=5$, its normalizing integral and first-moment integral areHence the next-year predictive expected value isThe Bühlmann credibility premium optimizes over affine estimates, whereas the Bayesian posterior mean optimizes over all square-integrable estimates. This explains why the two credibility estimates need not agree for this nonconjugate prior.

A credibility estimate combines a risk's own observed experience with a collective or prior mean, in the form $Z{\hat{\mu }}_{\mathrm{experience}}+(1-Z){\mu }_{\mathrm{collective}}$. The credibility factor $Z\in [0,1]$ is the weight given to that risk's experience. Bayesian credibility starts with a prior distribution for a latent risk parameter, updates it using observations, and estimates the conditional risk mean by its Bayesian posterior expected value under squared-error loss. In conjugate models this posterior mean can have exactly the displayed credibility form.

For the unequal policy exposures, defineConditional independence of the binomial distribution observations gives the likelihood, up to a factor not depending on $\theta$,Multiplication by the beta distribution prior therefore gives Beta-binomial conjugacy:Both posterior parameters are positive, since $0\le s\le M$ and the prior parameters are positive.

The conditional target is $\mu (\theta )=m_{k+1}\theta$. To verify the quadratic-loss rule directly, for any proposed estimate $d$ and observed data $\mathcal{D}$,The variance term does not depend on $d$, so the unique Bayes estimator under squared error loss is the posterior mean. Applying the beta mean formula givesIt is also the posterior expected future claim count, by the tower property of conditional expectation.

Let $p_0=\alpha /(\alpha +\beta )$ be the collective prior claim probability and $\hat{p}=s/M$ the observed claims per policy. ThenTherefore the exact beta-binomial credibility with unequal exposures isThe individual experience must be weighted by exposure: $s/M$ is the policy-weighted frequency, not the unweighted average of $x_i/m_i$ when the $m_i$ differ. The factor multiplies next-year expected counts after scaling both component probabilities by $m_{k+1}$.

Use the primitive $U(c)=c^{1-R}/(1-R)$, as in Question 3, and the usual positive spot volatility convention $\sigma >0$. An additive utility function constant shifts both agents' value functions equally and does not affect their policies or the comparison. SetThe Itô formula applied to the stock price and the binary Brownian drift filter givesLet ${\theta }_t$ denote the dollar stock holding. The separated state equations areBoth states use the same observed Brownian motion. In particular, their quadratic covariation is $d[w,X{]}_t=\sigma {\theta }_{t}dt$.

Let $J(w,x)$ be the Bayesian value function. Its Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation isThe cross derivative is necessary: learning and portfolio wealth are correlated through the same observation shock. At a smooth, finite, strictly concave value, the optimal consumption and stock holding areThe number of shares is ${\theta }^{\ast }/S$, and the wealth fraction is ${\theta }^{\ast }/w$.

More explicitly, homogeneity gives $J(w,x)=K(x)w^p/p$, where $p=1-R$. ThenThe additional term is the learning hedge in a binary-drift investment model, a form of intertemporal hedging demand. Merely putting the Bayesian posterior mean drift into a constant-coefficient investment formula would omit it. Eliminating the controls gives the coefficient equationThe economic solution is selected by admissibility and the infinite-horizon value condition, rather than by an arbitrary solution of this ordinary differential equation.

For the comparison, now suppose $0<R<1$ and $\mu >r$. Write $m=\mu -r>0$, $b_{+}=m+\sigma a$, andWhen ${\gamma }_{+}>0$, the informed agent's Merton consumption-investment problem has valueThese are the policies available to an agent who knows the true drift is $+a$.

For any admissible Bayesian policy, not only its optimum, defineThe integration variable is $s$ throughout the accumulated utility function. Applying the Itô formula in the Bayesian observation filtration giveswhereThe informed-agent Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation says ${\sup }_{c,\theta }{H}_{b_{+}}=0$. Maximizing the stock term at any excess drift $b$ givesSince $V_{+}^{\prime \prime }<0$, this maximum increases with $b^2$. The binary Brownian drift filter satisfies $|h(x)|\le a$, and thereforeIt follows that $H_{b(x)}(w,c,\theta )\le {\sup }_{c,\theta }{H}_{b(x)}\le {\sup }_{c,\theta }{H}_{b_{+}}=0$. Thus $Y$ is a local supermartingale. Because $0<R<1$, both accumulated utility function and $V_{+}$ are nonnegative. A nonnegative local supermartingale is a genuine supermartingale, by localization and the conditional Fatou lemma. This proves the requested assertion under the Bayesian probability law, without conditioning that law on the favorable drift.

ConsequentlyThe monotone convergence theorem lets $t$ tend to infinity. Taking the supremum over Bayesian policies proves the maximal squared Sharpe ratio value boundIn particular this holds at the equal-prior state $x=0$. No vanishing-terminal-value assumption is needed for this upper bound, because the terminal term is nonnegative and can simply be dropped.

The finite-value assumption ${\gamma }_{+}>0$ is missing from the printed comparison. Without it, $V_{+}=+\infty$ and the value inequality is trivial, but $Y$ is not a finite supermartingale. For a concrete allowed example, take $r=0$, $\mu =1$, $\sigma =a=1$, $R=1/2$ and $\rho =1$. Then $b_{+}=2$ and ${\gamma }_{+}=-2$. For the informed agent, the constant stock fraction $\pi =4$ and consumption $c=w/2$ giveThe time integral diverges, so his value is infinite. This is why the nontrivial finite-supermartingale proof above needs the stated qualification.

Treat the two-point prior for $\alpha$ as independent of the driving Brownian motion. On a partition $0=t_0<\cdots <t_n=t$, conditionally on $\alpha =\pm a$, the increments of $X$ are independent normal distributions with means $\pm a\Delta t_j$ and variances $\Delta t_j$. Their likelihood ratio isThus every partition containing $t$ gives the same Bayesian posterior, depending only on the endpoint. Refine partitions through a dense set of observation times. Continuity makes their increasing observation fields generate the full path field ${\mathcal{X}}_t$, and convergence of bounded conditional expectations preserves that Bayesian posterior. Equal prior probabilities and the Bayes' theorem consequently giveIts conditional mean drift isThis is the binary Brownian drift filter.

Define the observed innovation processIt is continuous and adapted to ${\mathcal{X}}_t$. For $s<t$, independence of future Brownian motion increments from the past and the latent drift givesFor every $u\ge s$, the tower property of conditional expectation givesSince $|h|\le a$, conditional integration is justified. Subtracting the integrated identities shows $E[{\hat{W}}_t-{\hat{W}}_s\mid {\mathcal{X}}_s]=0$. Thus $\hat{W}$ is a square-integrable martingale. Subtracting a continuous finite variation process does not change quadratic variation, so $[\hat{W}{]}_t=[X{]}_t=[W{]}_t=t$. The Lévy characterization of Brownian motion now proves that $\hat{W}$ is a Brownian motion in the observation filtration. Therefore

A credibility estimate blends the risk's own sample mean with a population or prior expected value. In the basic equal-exposure form it is $Z\overline{X}+(1-Z)\mu$, where the credibility factor $Z\in [0,1]$ is the weight attached to the individual experience. More data ordinarily increase that weight; greater within-risk variation relative to between-risk variation reduces it.

Write $m(\theta )=\mu (\theta )$ for the conditional claim expected value, keeping $\mu$ for the prior-level parameter. Normalization of the probability density function givesAt interior points of its finite domain, differentiation under the integral sign yieldsThis is an instance of the exponential-family derivative identities for natural parameter $-\theta$. The minus sign is present in the PDF and is lost in the converted TeX. The conditional variance is likewise $(\log q{)}^{\prime \prime }(\theta )$.

Differentiate the log of the natural conjugate prior:Integrate on a compact subinterval and then let its endpoints approach those of the parameter interval. The prescribed vanishing of the prior density eliminates the boundary term. Since $m(\theta )\ge 0$, monotone convergence theorem justifies the limit of its expectation, and the identity givesIn particular the assumed proper prior and boundary conditions themselves establish this first-moment integrability.

For $T={\sum }_{i=1}^n{x}_i$ and $\overline{x}=T/n$, conditional independence makes the likelihood function proportional to $q(\theta {)}^{-n}{e}^{-\theta T}$. Multiplication by the prior distribution gives the Bayesian posteriorThus this is a conjugate prior family, with updated parameters

The integration-by-parts calculation for the posterior mean also needs vanishing posterior boundary values. Here that property can be checked, rather than assumed. Let $a,b$ be the essential lower and upper endpoints of the claim support. Every nondegenerate tilted claim law has $a<m(\theta )<b$, so the established prior mean satisfies $a<\mu <b$. Supported observations have $\overline{x}\in [a,b]$; hence $a<{\mu }_n<b$. At a finite parameter endpoint the prior's vanishing forces $q(\theta )\to \infty$, because its exponential factor has a finite positive limit; the increased power $q^{-k_n}$ makes the posterior vanish there too. At $\theta \to +\infty$, choose $a<d<{\mu }_n$ with positive base-measure mass below $d$. Then $q(\theta )\ge C{e}^{-d\theta }$ and the unnormalized posterior is at most $C^{-k_n}{e}^{-k_n({\mu }_n-d)\theta }\to 0$. At $\theta \to -\infty$, choose ${\mu }_n<d<b$ with positive mass above $d$ to obtain the corresponding bound $C^{-k_n}{e}^{k_n(d-{\mu }_n)\theta }\to 0$. These bounds also ensure posterior propriety at infinite endpoints. This is the endpoint control for a Laplace-family conjugate posterior.

Apply the previous score integration to the Bayesian posterior. The natural conjugate credibility identity isThus $Z=n/(n+k)$ is the credibility factor. This is an exact posterior mean, rather than an affine approximation to one.

For the specific shape-two gamma distribution, takeThen $m(\theta )=2/\theta$ and $\mathrm{Var}(X\mid \theta )=2/{\theta }^2$. The gamma rate gamma conjugacy prior isthat is, $\Theta \sim \mathrm{Gamma}(2k+1,\text{rate }k\mu )$. Its normalizing constant in the notation of the question is $c(\mu ,k)=\Gamma (2k+1)/(k\mu {)}^{2k+1}$. The gamma distribution density vanishes at both zero and infinity for $k>0$. The posterior has shape $2k+2n+1$ and rate $k\mu +T$, so its conditional-mean posterior mean is again $(k\mu +T)/(k+n)$.

For the last calculation, gamma distribution integration givesThe second identity requires the printed $k>1/2$. Therefore the expected process variance and variance of hypothetical means, denoted by $a,b$ in this question, areConsequently $a/b=k$, and the Bühlmann credibility factor agrees with the exact Bayesian weight:This is the exact Bühlmann credibility for gamma claims, expressed using the reciprocal rate as the random scale. The symbols $a,b$ here are the process and between-risk variances, respectively; their roles should not be interchanged when comparing with other notation for the Bühlmann model.