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Probability inequalities bound event probabilities from limited information, such as moments, without requiring a complete probability distribution. Markov's inequality uses a nonnegative random variable's expected value; Chebyshev's inequality uses a variance to bound deviations from a mean. The attraction is a guarantee that applies to many possible probability distributions. Their bounds can be conservative for a particular model, and distributions attaining equality show when the available information really cannot give more.

A probability measure is a nonnegative, countably additive measure with total mass one. Thus $\mathbb{P}(\Omega )=1$, and for pairwise disjoint events $A_j$,The complement of an event has probability $1-\mathbb{P}(A)$. The probability of a union of overlapping events needs a correction: $\mathbb{P}(A\cup B)=\mathbb{P}(A)+\mathbb{P}(B)-\mathbb{P}(A\cap B)$. Counting the overlap once is the simplest instance of the inclusion-exclusion principle.

A zero-probability event need not be impossible as a member of the sample space. Under the continuous uniform distribution on $[0,1]$, every individual point has probability zero, while the whole interval has probability one. Countable additivity applies to countable unions, not arbitrary uncountable ones; there is no contradiction.

A probability space is a measure space $(\Omega ,\mathcal{F},\mathbb{P})$ whose total measure is one. The sample space $\Omega$ contains the elementary outcomes; the sigma-algebra $\mathcal{F}$ contains the events to which the model assigns probabilities; the probability measure $\mathbb{P}$ supplies those values. The sigma-algebra lets us combine observable questions using complements and countable unions while remaining within the model.

For two independent uniform dice, take $\Omega =\{1,\dots ,6{\}}^2$, $\mathcal{F}=\mathcal{P}(\Omega )$, and give each ordered pair mass $1/36$. A random variable might record the sum, the larger result, or whether both results are even integers. These are different functions on the same sample space, rather than different elementary experiments. A probability distribution records the mass of the values of one such random variable and can forget information retained by the full probability space.

Probability theory describes uncertainty through a probability space: possible outcomes form a sample space, observable questions are events, and a probability measure assigns them numbers between zero and one. The Kolmogorov axioms make those assignments consistent. They let us combine information about several events, update it through conditional probability, and study random variables without listing every possible outcome separately.

For example, roll two dice whose results are independent random variables, each with a discrete uniform distribution on $\{1,\dots ,6\}$. There are 36 equally likely ordered outcomes. Only $(1,6),(2,5),\dots ,(6,1)$ have sum seven, so that event has probability $6/36=1/6$. The sum itself is not uniformly distributed: sum two has only one outcome. Choosing a probability distribution for the elementary outcomes is part of the model; equal likelihood does not follow merely from counting the named possibilities.

The subject becomes especially useful when complete outcome lists are enormous or infinite. Independence turns a joint calculation into simpler pieces, expected value summarizes a random variable, and the law of large numbers explains how averages can become predictable even when individual observations are uncertain. The central limit theorem describes the scale and shape of many remaining fluctuations. These are distinct claims: a small variance of an average does not make every observation close to its expected value.

There is a satisfying unity here: dice, hidden causes, and Brownian motion all use the same rules for events and conditional probability. A model still needs justification. Its exact deductions describe what its assumptions imply; comparison with observations belongs to statistical inference.

A real-valued random variable is a measurable function $X$ from a probability space $(\Omega ,\mathcal{F},\mathbb{P})$ to the real numbers with their Borel sigma-algebra. More general targets give random elements. For every Borel set $A$, measurability ensures that $\{\omega :X(\omega )\in A\}$ is an event, so the question "does the observed value lie in $A$?" has a defined probability.

The function $X$ is fixed; its input outcome is uncertain. This separates what we measure from how the uncertainty is modeled. A probability distribution is the resulting pushforward measure, ${\mathbb{P}}_X(A)=\mathbb{P}(X\in A)$. A cumulative distribution function, probability mass function, or probability density function describes that measure in an appropriate setting. The random variable and its probability distribution are different objects: the former also retains its relationship to other measurements on the same sample space.

For two independent uniform dice, let $U,V$ record their results and define $S=U+V$ and $M=\max (U,V)$. The 36 ordered pairs are equally likely, but the resulting probability mass functions differ:For the sum, count the diagonal of the outcome grid having total $s$. For the maximum, subtract the $(m-1{)}^2$ pairs with both results below $m$ from the $m^2$ pairs with both results at most $m$. These examples show how a deterministic function transforms a simple input probability distribution into a nonuniform output one.

The corresponding expected values are $\mathbb{E}S=7$ and $\mathbb{E}M=161/36$. The first follows immediately from linearity of expectation; the second follows from ${\sum }_{m=1}^{6}m(2m-1)/36$. Neither number must be an attainable result. An expected value describes an average under the probability measure, not a prediction that the next observation will equal it.

The distinction between a random variable and its probability distribution matters for dependence. $U$ and $V$ have the same discrete uniform distribution and are independent random variables. $U$ and a second copy of $U$ also have that same marginal probability distribution, but they always agree. Their joint probability distribution is concentrated on the diagonal; the marginals alone cannot say which relationship holds. This is why a model for several measurements must specify their joint law or an appropriate independence assumption.

Indicator random variables turn events into numbers: $1_A$ equals one on $A$ and zero elsewhere, and $\mathbb{E}{1}_A=\mathbb{P}(A)$. This connects event counting with expected value and variance, and lets tools for random variables answer questions about probabilities. More complicated functions of observations can describe totals, waiting times, or estimation errors using the same framework.

Let $G$ be the event of membership in the first of two groups and $A$ the event of selection. Write $p=P(G)$, $a=P(G\mid A)$ and $q=P(A)>0$, with $0<p,a<1$. Bayes' theorem gives the conditional probabilities $r_1=P(A\mid G)=aq/p$ and $r_0=P(A\mid G^c)=(1-a)q/(1-p)$. Their risk ratio is the displayed expression: the unknown overall selection probability cancels. Equivalently, it is the ratio of the group-membership odds after selection to those before selection.

When both selection probabilities lie strictly between zero and one, the selection odds ratio is $[r_1/(1-r_1)]/[r_0/(1-r_0)]$ and generally depends on $q$. Thus compositions alone do not identify that odds ratio or provide sample sizes for a standard error. When $a<p$, the first group's observed selection rate is lower; this comparison alone does not establish a causal effect of group membership.

For any sequence of events, its limsup of events satisfiesSet $C_N={\bigcup }_{n\ge N}{A}_n$. These are decreasing events with intersection ${\mathrm{limsup}}_n{A}_n$. Continuity of probability from above givesThis is also the bounded-indicator form of the reversed Fatou lemma. The inequality can be strict: independent fair-coin head events each have probability $1/2$, while their limsup of events has probability $1$ by the Second Borel-Cantelli lemma.

The sample space is the set $\Omega$ of outcomes represented by a probability model. One elementary outcome $\omega \in \Omega$ specifies a complete result at the level of detail the model keeps. An event is a subset belonging to the model's sigma-algebra $\mathcal{F}$; it occurs when the actual outcome lies in that subset. Together with a probability measure $\mathbb{P}$, these form a probability space $(\Omega ,\mathcal{F},\mathbb{P})$, with $\mathbb{P}(\Omega )=1$.^[ref]

Choosing a sample space means deciding which distinctions matter. For two tosses, recording the ordered head-or-tail sequence distinguishes $HT$ from $TH$; recording only the number of heads merges them. Neither representation is automatically wrong, but the second cannot answer a question about which toss was heads. Keeping a detailed sample space and defining a random variable for the desired observation lets several questions share one model.

A sample space alone assigns no probabilities. Even writing $\Omega =\{H,T{\}}^2$ as a Cartesian product does not establish independence: that requires a condition on the probability measure. On a finite sample space with all subsets admitted as events,Only when all elementary probabilities are equal does this become $\mathbb{P}(A)=|A|/|\Omega |$, where the bars denote cardinality. This is the uniform distribution on a finite set, an additional modelling choice.

Sample spaces can also be infinite. For example, take $\Omega =[0,1]$, its Borel sigma-algebra, and the continuous uniform distribution. Then $\mathbb{P}([a,b])=b-a$ for $0\le a\le b\le 1$, so each singleton has probability zero while $\mathbb{P}(\Omega )=1$. Thus an elementary outcome need not carry positive probability, and a continuous model cannot be understood by counting equally likely points. The distinction is developed in zero-probability event and countable additivity.

For a nonnegative random variable $N$ with positive expected value and finite second moment, write $N=N{1}_{\{N>0\}}$. The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality giveswhich proves the bound in second moment method. It is the zero-threshold case of the Paley-Zygmund inequality. Equality occurs when $N$ is a fixed positive value on the event $N>0$ and zero elsewhere, almost surely. For $N=10B$ with $B$ a Bernoulli random variable of parameter $1/10$, $(\mathbb{E}N{)}^2/\mathbb{E}{N}^2=1/10$ equals the exact positivity probability.

The variance identity $\mathbb{E}{N}^2=(\mathbb{E}N{)}^2+\mathrm{Var}(N)$ turns the lower bound into a statement about variance relative to the squared mean. A small ratio forces positivity to be likely. A positive expected value alone does not do so: keeping $\mathbb{E}N=1$ while taking $N=1/q$ with probability $q$ and zero otherwise makes the positivity probability as small as any chosen $q>0$.

Choose one random variable $U$ with the continuous uniform distribution on $[0,1]$, and reuse it in every event:Each probability is $1/(n+1)$, so their harmonic series diverges, just as in summable and harmonic event probabilities. But the events are decreasing: $A_{n+1}\subseteq A_n$. For every outcome $U=u>0$, all indices with $n+1>1/u$ fail. Only finitely many events occur on that outcome. The limsup of events is exactly $\{U=0\}$, a zero-probability event. This is a concrete closed-interval version of the shrinking-interval dependence example.^[ref]

The missing assumption is visible already in two events. For $i<j$, their intersection is $A_j$, henceMoreover, the whole tail union is just $A_m$, with probability $1/(m+1)\to 0$. This calculation explains directly why divergence alone fails: overlapping events keep spending their individual probabilities on the same outcomes.

Let $N={\sum }_{n\ge 1}{1}_{A_n}$ be the total number of occurrences, a sum of indicator random variables. Although $N<\infty$ almost surely, Tonelli theorem gives $\mathbb{E}[N]={\sum }_{n\ge 1}1/(n+1)=\infty$. More explicitly, $\mathbb{P}(N\ge k)=1/(k+1)$ for $k\ge 1$: very small positive values of $U$ give very long, but finite, initial runs. Infinite expected value does not imply a positive probability of an infinite count.

Let a random vector $V$ have a finite actual range of $q$ values. Its nonempty fibres partition the sample space, and every event in $\sigma (V)$ is a union of those fibres. Thus each fibre is an atom of a sigma-algebra and $\sigma (V)$ has exactly $2^q$ elements. This assertion concerns the actual range; additional values attained only on null sets must still be counted when working with an uncompleted sigma-algebra literally.

To verify the claim, the fibres belong to $\sigma (V)$ as preimages of singleton Borel sets. Their unions form a finite sigma-algebra making $V$ measurable, so minimality of the generated sigma-algebra gives the reverse inclusion. Distinct subcollections have distinct unions because the fibres are nonempty and disjoint.

Consequently a finite history of finite-valued observations generates a finite natural filtration at each fixed time. It may be strictly smaller than the filtration of its driving continuous observations: a single uniform random variable already generates infinitely many distinct events $\{U\le t\}$ with different probabilities.

Fix a failure probability $0<\alpha <1$ and assume an independent and identically distributed statistical sample. A finite-sample confidence band for its population cumulative distribution function isHere $\log$ is the natural logarithm. The DKW inequality impliesThis is simultaneous coverage over the whole real line, valid at each fixed sample size.^[ref]

To obtain the band, solve $2e^{-2n{\epsilon }^2}=\alpha$ for the positive $\epsilon$. Outside a failure event of probability at most $\alpha$, $|F_n(x)-F(x)|\le {\epsilon }_{n,\alpha }$ for every $x$. Since a cumulative distribution function already lies in $[0,1]$, clipping the endpoints to this interval preserves the coverage event. The guarantee is at least $1-\alpha$, and need not equal it.

Choose $\alpha =0.1$, giving at least $90\%$ simultaneous coverage under the stated model. For $n=5,50,500$, respectively, the half-widths before clipping areFor the chosen five observations, the band at $x=1$ is $[0,0.94733]$, while at $x=4$ it is approximately $[0.25267,1]$. At $x=3$ the unclipped band would be $[0.05267,1.14733]$, so clipping gives $[0.05267,1]$. The broad uncertainty is informative: five observations give a precise description of themselves, but a coarse bound for an unknown population cumulative distribution function.

A collection of $90\%$ pointwise confidence intervals only promises coverage separately at each preselected threshold; it does not promise $90\%$ coverage of an entire cumulative distribution function. Here the one simultaneous event permits inspecting any threshold after seeing the data. The probability refers to repeated sampling of the entire statistical sample, with $F$ fixed. It does not assign $90\%$ probability to a fixed $F$ after observing this particular band, and it is not a prediction interval for a future observation. The displayed $n=5,50,500$ comparison gives a guarantee for each fixed $n$ separately, not simultaneous validity over all sample sizes or an optional stopping rule. The chosen observations are an illustration; the coverage claim follows from the DKW inequality, not from their appearance or a simulation. Dependence or observations with different sampling laws require another argument.

At fixed $\alpha$, multiplying $n$ by $100$ divides the half-width by $10$. Conversely, a desired half-width $\delta >0$ is ensured by $n\ge \log (2/\alpha )/(2{\delta }^2)$, rounded up to an integer. For $\alpha =0.1$ and $\delta =0.1$, this sufficient sample size is $150$. This makes the confidence band useful for planning how many observations are needed before estimating threshold probabilities to a chosen simultaneous accuracy.

If $X\sim N(\mu ,{\sigma }^2)$ with $\sigma >0$, then $Z=(X-\mu )/\sigma$ has the standard normal distribution. The change-of-variables formula for a probability density gives $f_Z(z)=\sigma f_X(\mu +\sigma z)=\varphi (z)$, the standard normal density. Thus standardization of a normal random variable removes both parameters without changing the probabilities of corresponding events.

The same stopping rule connects a waiting count to a fixed-length count. Let $N=X+r$ be the trial number of the $r$th success, and let $B_n$ count successes in the first $n$ trials, so $B_n$ has a binomial distribution. For any nonnegative integer $n$,The target is still unmet after $n$ trials exactly when fewer than $r$ successes have occurred. With $r=2$, $p=1/2$ and $n=4$, this gives $\mathbb{P}(N>4)=(1+4)/16=5/16$; equivalently, $\mathbb{P}(X\le 2)=1-5/16=11/16$, matching $1/4+1/4+3/16$. At $p=1$, the event identity still holds, with $N=r$ and $B_n=n$ deterministically.

In independent Bernoulli trials with success probability $p$ and failure probability $q=1-p$, let $T_n$ be the trial of success $n$ and $U_m$ the trial of failure $m$, for positive integers $n,m$. If success $n$ occurs after $k<m$ failures, its final trial is a success and the preceding trials have $n-1$ successes and $k$ failures. The negative binomial stopping argument therefore gives the title sum.

Put $F=n+m$. By trial $F-1$, at least one target must have been reached, so the same event is that a binomial distribution with $F-1$ trials has at least $n$ successes. Conditioning instead on the final trial of a block of $F$ trials givesIndeed, more than $n$ successes in the full block guarantee the success target won; with exactly $n$ successes it won only when the final trial was a failure. These disjoint cases explain the extra boundary term. A zero success target wins immediately; a zero failure target has already been reached. To include $n=0$ in the displayed finite sum requires the explicit generalized convention $\left(\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{-1}{0}\right)=1$; an upper summation limit of $-1$ denotes an empty sum.

Take independent random variables $U_n$, each with the continuous uniform distribution on $[0,1]$, and set $A_n=\{U_n\le p_n\}$. Then $\mathbb{P}(A_n)=p_n$, and the events are mutually independent events. The product probability space supplies a model for the entire infinite sequence; a finite list of simulated values is only an illustration.

For $p_n=1/(n+1{)}^2$, the p-series is summable:The Basel problem supplies the total sum, and the integral test for convergence gives the displayed tail bound. The First Borel-Cantelli lemma makes the limsup of events have probability zero. In fact, the tail bound implies that the probability of even one alarm at or after $m$ is at most $1/m$; for $m=100$, it is at most $0.01$. This bound remains valid for dependent events with the same individual probabilities.

For $p_n=1/(n+1)$, the harmonic series diverges, so the Second Borel-Cantelli lemma makes the limsup of events have probability one. There is also an exact finite-horizon calculation using independent events:For any fixed $m$, this finite product of numbers tends to zero as $M\to \infty$. Every infinite tail therefore contains an alarm almost surely, even though the individual probabilities tend to zero.

A tail event is an event $A\in \mathcal{T}$, where $\mathcal{T}$ is the tail sigma-algebra of the chosen sequence of random variables. It concerns information available arbitrarily far along the sequence. In the measurable coordinate models described in finite-prefix invariance of tail events, any finite edit preserves whether it occurs.

This is stronger than merely needing a long waiting time. On $\{0,1{\}}^{\mathbb{N}}$, with $1$ denoting heads, let $K=\inf \{j\ge 1:X_j=1\}$, taking $K=\infty$ if there is no head. The eventis not a tail event: changing only $X_1$ from zero to one changes membership. Under fair independent Bernoulli trials its probability is $1/8$. Even the event $\{K<\infty \}$, of probability one in this model, is not a tail event as a literal set: the all-zero sequence and the sequence with just one initial head differ in one coordinate. A probability of zero or one does not characterize tail events.

Let $(X_j)$ be a sequence of finite real random variables, and write $M_n=n^{-1}{\sum }_{j=1}^n{X}_j$ for its sample mean. For fixed $m$ and $n>m$, put $M_n^{(m)}=n^{-1}{\sum }_{j=m+1}^n{X}_j$. Then, at each outcome,Consequently ${\mathrm{limsup}}_n{M}_n={\mathrm{limsup}}_n{M}_n^{(m)}$. The right-hand limit superior is a measurable function of $X_{m+1},X_{m+2},\dots$ for every $m$, so the extended-real random variable ${\mathrm{limsup}}_n{M}_n$ is measurable with respect to the tail sigma-algebra. The same holds for the limit inferior. Thus the event of convergence to a finite limit of a sequence, and the event $\{M_n\to a\}$ for any specified real $a$, are tail events.

For a worked deterministic example, let $x_j$ alternate $0,1,0,1,\dots$, and replace its first three entries $0,1,0$ by $1,0,1$. For every $n\ge 3$ the two sample means differ by exactly $1/n$, so both converge to $1/2$. Finite edits can change small-sample answers while preserving the infinite limit of a sequence.

Under independence, Kolmogorov's zero–one law makes each specified convergence event have probability zero or one. It does not select which value occurs. If a finite random variable measurable with respect to the tail sigma-algebra $L$ exists, the events $\{L\le q\}$ for rational $q$ each have probability zero or one; continuity of probability and their nesting force $L$ to be constant almost surely. For fair independent Bernoulli trials, the strong law of large numbers establishes $M_n\to 1/2$ almost surely; the zero–one conclusion alone proves neither convergence nor the value $1/2$.

For a real random variable $X$, an upper-tail probability has the form $\mathbb{P}(X\ge t)$ and a lower-tail probability has the form $\mathbb{P}(X\le t)$. Each is the probability of an event lying beyond a chosen threshold in one direction. A tail probability need not be small: the threshold determines how much of the probability distribution it includes. A concentration inequality bounds such probabilities, often for deviations from an expected value.

Endpoint conventions matter. Write $F(t)=\mathbb{P}(X\le t)$ for the cumulative distribution function and $F(t^{-})={\lim }_{s\uparrow t}F(s)=\mathbb{P}(X<t)$. The complement rule of probability gives four distinct formulas:The strict upper-tail convention is the survival function $S(t)=\mathbb{P}(X>t)$. Its value differs from the inclusive upper tail probability by exactly the probability mass at the threshold:A singleton with positive probability mass is an atom of a measure. Thus $1-F(t)$ excludes an atom of a measure at $t$, whereas $1-F(t^{-})$ includes it. These endpoint identities follow directly from the cumulative distribution function properties in Kyle Siegrist, Distribution and Quantile Functions: endpoint probabilities and right tails.

As the threshold increases, both upper tail probabilities are nonincreasing functions. The strict survival function is a right-continuous function; the inclusive upper tail probability takes the upper endpoint value at a downward jump, equal to the left limit of the survival function. Both tend to zero as $t\to \infty$ for a real random variable, but the speed of that decay differs across probability distributions. The cumulative distribution function properties and their proof from continuity of probability measures are given in MIT 6.436J, Lecture 4: random variables and cumulative distribution function properties.

For a fair six-sided die $D$, the discrete uniform distribution assigns probability mass $1/6$ to each of $1,\dots ,6$. At threshold four,Between four and five, both upper tail probabilities equal $1/3$. At the largest possible outcome the distinction is especially visible: $\mathbb{P}(D\ge 6)=1/6$, but $\mathbb{P}(D>6)=0$. The diagram shows exact probabilities for this mathematical model; its dots specify which endpoints belong to each step function.

If a probability distribution has a probability density function $f$, then every singleton has zero probability mass andFor an exponential distribution of rate two, $f(x)=2e^{-2x}$ for $x\ge 0$ and zero otherwise, so $S(t)=e^{-2t}$ for $t\ge 0$ and $S(t)=1$ for $t<0$. Hence $\mathbb{P}(X\ge 1)=e^{-2}\approx 0.135335$. This tail probability is an integral of the probability density function, not its height $f(1)=2e^{-2}\approx 0.270671$. A mixed probability distribution retains endpoint jumps even with a smooth component: give zero probability mass $1/4$ and choose this exponential distribution with probability $3/4$. Then $\mathbb{P}(X\ge 0)=1$, $\mathbb{P}(X>0)=3/4$, and $S(t)=(3/4)e^{-2t}$ for $t\ge 0$.

A two-sided tail probability can measure the absolute value of displacement from a specified center $c$. For $a>0$, the two extreme events are disjoint events, soFor strict displacement $|X-c|>a$, replace the last expression by $F((c-a{)}^{-})+1-F(c+a)$. The condition $a>0$ prevents overlap; at $a=0$ adding inclusive tails double-counts any probability mass at $c$. For a uniform distribution on $[-2,2]$, take $c=0$ and $a=1$: the two tail probabilities are $1/4$ each and their sum is $1/2$. Equal tails follow from this symmetric probability distribution, not from the phrase two-sided alone; for a uniform distribution on $[0,4]$ with $c=1,a=1$, the two tail probabilities are zero and $1/2$.

The tail-sum formula for expectation turns a whole curve of tail probabilities into an expected value. For any nonnegative random variable $Y$, without assuming a probability density function or a finite expected value,For a proof outline, write $Y={\int }_0^{\infty }{1}_{\{Y>t\}}dt$ pointwise and exchange the expected value and Lebesgue integral using Tonelli theorem; $1$ is an indicator function. The inclusive version has the same Lebesgue integral: positive probability masses occur at only a countable set of thresholds, which has Lebesgue measure zero. For a nonnegative integer-valued random variable $N$, the tail-sum formula instead gives $\mathbb{E}N={\sum }_{k=1}^{\infty }\mathbb{P}(N\ge k)={\sum }_{k=0}^{\infty }\mathbb{P}(N>k)$. The integer hypothesis is essential for these sums. The integral identity, its indicator function proof, and the integer version appear in Kyle Siegrist, Additional Properties of Expected Value: integration and summation of right tails.

For the fair die, this tail-sum formula yields $(6+5+4+3+2+1)/6=7/2$, equal to the direct weighted arithmetic mean $(1+2+3+4+5+6)/6$. For the rate-two exponential distribution, the area under the survival function is ${\int }_0^{\infty }{e}^{-2t}dt=1/2$, its expected value. The first panel below shades an integral of the probability density function for a single threshold; the second shades an integral of the survival function across all nonnegative thresholds. These are analytical illustrations, with the displayed curves truncated at three; their exact total areas use an infinite integration range.

Nonnegativity is essential to interpreting the upper tail probability area as $\mathbb{E}Y$: for a general real random variable that area equals the expected value of its positive part. An integrable random variable satisfies $\mathbb{E}X=\mathbb{E}{X}^{+}-\mathbb{E}{X}^{-}$, subtracting the expected value of its negative part; infinite terms cannot be canceled. Even when $Y$ is finite almost surely, its expected value can be infinite. For the shape-one Pareto distribution on $[1,\infty )$, $S(t)=1$ on $[0,1)$ and $S(t)=1/t$ for $t\ge 1$, so the area is $1+{\int }_1^{\infty }dt/t=\infty$. The finite versus infinite expected value distinction is illustrated in Kyle Siegrist, Definitions and Basic Properties: exponential and Pareto expected values.

Why are tail probabilities useful? They answer threshold questions directly, and a concentration inequality can bound them without knowing the full probability distribution. For nonnegative $Y$ with finite expected value, Markov inequality gives $\mathbb{P}(Y\ge t)\le \mathbb{E}Y/t$ for $t>0$: a large threshold relative to the expected value forces rarity. The quantile function reverses the question by choosing a threshold for a prescribed cumulative level. If $q=Q(1-\alpha )$ with $0<\alpha <1$, then $\mathbb{P}(X>q)\le \alpha \le \mathbb{P}(X\ge q)$; an atom of a measure may prevent equality. For the die, $Q(0.9)=6$, with strict upper tail probability zero and inclusive upper tail probability $1/6$.

A tail probability describes rarity under a specified probability distribution; it is not automatically a conditional probability after extra information. For $u\ge t$ with $\mathbb{P}(X\ge t)>0$,because the threshold events are nested. Thus the die has $\mathbb{P}(D\ge 5)=1/3$ but $\mathbb{P}(D\ge 5\mid D\ge 4)=2/3$. Conditioning changes the sample space and renormalizes its probability measure; the same extreme outcomes can become common in that restricted population.

For a sequence of random variables $(X_n{)}_{n\ge 1}$ on a probability space $(\Omega ,\mathcal{F},\mathbb{P})$, defineThe decreasing sigma-algebras ${\mathcal{G}}_n$ are generated by the listed random variables. Their intersection consists of events expressible after discarding every finite prefix. No independence is required.^[ref]

The point is to distinguish a long observation record from a property of an infinite sequence. The event of seeing infinitely many heads and the event that sample means converge survive any finite change, while an exact first-head time does not. Kolmogorov's zero–one law adds the striking conclusion that under independence each tail event has probability zero or one; the tail sigma-algebra itself can still contain many nonempty sets.