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When the prior odds of a real effect are $R$, a study's Type I error is $\alpha$, and its statistical power is $1-\beta$, a positive report updates those odds to $R(1-\beta )/\alpha$. This follows directly from Bayes' theorem. A small false-positive rate does not itself make the effect's posterior probability high: the prior odds and power also matter. The posterior exceeds one half exactly when $R>\alpha /(1-\beta )$.

A Bayes factor measures how data change the relative support for two specified statistical models. Write $m_j(D)=p(D\mid H_j)$ for their Bayesian model evidence and define the direction explicitly:For positive finite $m_0(D),m_1(D)$, a value above one favors $H_1$ over $H_0$; a value below one favors $H_0$ over $H_1$. Reversing the comparison gives $B_{01}={\mathrm{BF}}_{01}=1/{\mathrm{BF}}_{10}$, the opposite direction used in some formulas below.

For mutually exclusive, exhaustive $H_0,H_1$ with positive prior probabilities, divide their two Bayes' theorem formulas. Their common data normalizer cancels, leavingThe Bayes factor therefore multiplies prior odds into posterior odds. It is evidence conditional on the specified statistical models and their within-model prior distributions; it is not $\mathbb{P}(H_1\mid D)$. Model prior probabilities supply a separate input.^[ref]

For an original stipulated example, consider ten independent and identically distributed Bernoulli trials, with heads as success. Compare $H_0:p=0.4$ with $H_1:p=0.7$, both fixed before seeing the data. Take $D$ to be one particular ordered sequence containing eight heads and two tails. The likelihood function under either point model is $p^8(1-p{)}^2$, soIf $\mathbb{P}(H_1)=0.1$, the prior odds for $H_1$ against $H_0$ are $1/9$. Hence the posterior odds are $21.9909706/9\approx 2.4434412$, andEqual model prior probabilities would instead give ${\mathrm{BF}}_{10}/(1+{\mathrm{BF}}_{10})\approx 0.956505$. The same Bayes factor can thus accompany different posterior probabilities. These statements condition on the two-model comparison; they do not establish that either statistical model describes a real coin.

Using the heads count $K=8$ instead of the ordered sequence changes the sample space. The binomial distribution assigns it mass $\left(\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{10}{8}\right)p^8(1-p{)}^2$. The same binomial coefficient multiplies both models' Bayesian model evidence and cancels in their Bayes factor. Mixing an ordered-sequence numerator with a count denominator would introduce an erroneous factor of $45$.

Fix the candidate statistical models, their parameter prior distributions, and model prior probabilities before using the current data for this update. The Bayes factor is useful because it separates evidence from model prior odds, but it still depends on the parameter prior distributions. An improper prior has an arbitrary multiplicative normalization: multiplying its kernel by $c$ multiplies its formal marginal likelihood by $c$, even if the within-model posterior distribution is normalizable. Without a separately justified convention, the ordinary Bayes factor is then undefined up to arbitrary constants.^[ref]

For a random sample $X_i\mid \theta \sim N(\theta ,{\sigma }^2)$ with known $\sigma >0$ and prior distribution $\theta \sim N(0,{\tau }^2)$ with $\tau >0$, compare $H_0:\theta <0$ to $H_1:\theta \ge 0$. The prior odds are one by symmetry. Normal-normal conjugacy gives a normal posterior distribution withIts negative and nonnegative masses are $\Phi (-z)$ and $\Phi (z)$, whereSince the Bayes factor is the posterior odds divided by the prior odds,Here $\Phi$ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. The ratio decreases with the sample mean. For any threshold $b>0$, the inequality $B_{01}<b$ is equivalent to $\Phi (z)>1/(1+b)$ and hence toFor $b=1/10$, the quantile is ${\Phi }^{-1}(10/11)\approx 1.33518$, and the equivalent posterior probability threshold for $H_0$ is $1/11$. The symmetry and proper normalization of the two hypothesis-conditional priors are essential to replacing the Bayes factor by the posterior odds directly.

Evidence $E$ confirms $H$ relative to background $K$ when it increases its conditional probability. With $0<P(H\mid K)<1$ and positive evidence probability, Bayes' theorem givesIndeed, writing $p=P(H\mid K)$, $a=P(E\mid H,K)$ and $b=P(E\mid \neg H,K)$ gives the posterior probability $pa/(pa+(1-p)b)$; comparison with $p$ reduces to $a>b$. Thus scientific confirmation depends on the alternatives and background, not just on a statement's logical form.

An optimal stopping problem in which observations update a posterior probability distribution over an unknown parameter. The decision state includes that posterior.

For a finite measurable partition $(B_j)$ with positive probabilities, and an event $A$ of positive probability,Its beauty is that a model predicting observations from a hidden state can also describe uncertainty about the state after an observation. Each numerator is a joint probability; the denominator, supplied by the law of total probability, makes the answers sum to one. This is a direct consequence of conditional probability, rather than an extra axiom.

Select the coin from law of total probability once, then toss that same coin repeatedly, with conditionally independent tosses given its identity. Let $B$ denote the $3/4$-head coin, initially of prior probability $1/5$. After one head $H$, its posterior probability isThe likelihood of a head is larger under $B$, but $B$ remains less likely than the other coin because its prior probability was smaller. A large likelihood for an observation does not itself imply a large posterior probability for the hypothesis.

After an ordered sequence containing $h$ heads and $t$ tails, its likelihood ratio between the two coins is $(3/2{)}^h(1/2{)}^t$. Bayes' theorem therefore gives posterior oddsEach head multiplies the odds by $3/2$ and each tail by $1/2$. Three heads give posterior probability $27/59$, still below one half; four give $81/145$, above one half. The finite-model update and the distinction between prior probability, likelihood and posterior probability are set out in MIT 18.05, Reading 11: Bayesian Updating with Discrete Priors.

The hidden selection also creates dependence. Each toss has marginal head probability $11/20$, but two heads have joint probability $(4/5)(1/2{)}^2+(1/5)(3/4{)}^2=5/16$, greater than $(11/20{)}^2=121/400$. Their indicator covariance is $1/100$. Seeing a head makes the head-favoring coin more likely, so it also raises the chance of a future head. This is covariance induced by a shared latent variable, despite conditional independence of the tosses given the coin.

Historically, Thomas Bayes's essay on an unknown success probability appeared in 1763 after his death, communicated by Richard Price. Its opening problem asks how observed successes and failures constrain that unknown probability; Price's introductory letter explains the connection to reasoning from experience. That is a more substantial inference problem than simply rearranging today's elementary identity. ^[ref]

A capture-recapture model is a statistical model for repeated observations of identifiable individuals, including those missed on some occasions. A closed-population capture-recapture model estimates a fixed population cardinality; models allowing individuals to enter or leave can instead describe survival and recruitment. The sampling assumptions determine which likelihood function is appropriate.

For the two-sample closed-population capture-recapture model, condition on the sample sizes $M$ and $C$. If the second sample selects $C$ distinct individuals from $N$ by simple random sampling, then the overlap $R$ has the hypergeometric distribution:Here $r$ is an integer and the probability mass function is zero outside these bounds. The binomial coefficients count choices of $r$ marked and $C-r$ unmarked individuals, divided by all equally likely size-$C$ subsets. The hypergeometric distribution has expected valueEquating the observed overlap with this expected value gives the Lincoln-Petersen estimator. The underlying sampling without replacement, probability mass function, and expected value are developed in Raymond P. Guiteras, MIT 14.30 hypergeometric distribution handout, §§1–4 and 8.

For the toy counts $M=20$, $C=25$, and $R=5$, hold the observations fixed and vary the unknown integer $N$. The likelihood function isValues below forty cannot contain the observed set union. Exact comparison of consecutive likelihoods gives two tied maximum-likelihood estimates, $N=99$ and $N=100$. The Lincoln-Petersen estimator returns $100$; the Chapman estimator returns $90$ and is a different rule for estimation.

The vertical scale is $L(N)/{\max }_{n\ge 40}L(n)$. This relative likelihood compares how well candidate statistical parameters explain the same observations; it is not a posterior probability. The displayed range $40\le N\le 300$ is only a plotting window. The likelihood function remains positive for every integer $N\ge 40$ and tends to zero as $N$ increases, so the curve has a continuing right tail. The data do not justify truncating statistical inference at three hundred. The conditional hypergeometric distribution formulation also appears in Louis-Paul Rivest and Mamadou Yauck, Small Sample Estimators for Two-way Capture Recapture Experiments, §3, equation (5).

Zero recaptures require care. With $R=0$ and positive $M,C$, the Lincoln-Petersen estimator has no finite ratio, but the capture-recapture model still gives a valid likelihood function:This likelihood function increases toward one as $N$ grows, so there is no finite maximum-likelihood estimate. For the same sample sizes twenty and twenty-five with zero overlap, forty-five distinct individuals would be observed. Lack of overlap supplies a lower bound but very weak information about large population cardinalities.

In more elaborate capture-recapture models, a first-recapture array $m_{ij}$ counts individuals released at occasion $i$ and next observed at $j$. A probability of survival ${\varphi }_j$ and a probability of detection $P_{j+1}$ contribute a no-observation continuation factor ${\varphi }_j(1-P_{j+1})$. The resulting likelihood function depends on both survival and detection; these probabilities need not be separately identifiable at the last observation interval. Missing-count EM for capture-recapture describes one way to fit such a model, and identifiability remains a separate issue from computing an estimator output.

A confidence interval is a random interval constructed from a statistical sample to cover a fixed unknown statistical parameter with a prescribed coverage probability. For a scalar target $\theta$, a procedure with nominal confidence $1-\alpha$ satisfiesThe subscript records which probability distribution generates the repeated samples. The endpoints are statistics, so they vary from sample to sample; the target is fixed. Equality gives exact nominal coverage probability, while the inequality also permits conservative procedures. For a general estimand $\psi (\theta )$, replace the target inside the interval by $\psi (\theta )$.

A realized confidence interval communicates the precision of an estimate in the target's own units. Reporting $1.2$ alone conceals the difference between an estimate with standard error $0.5$ and one with standard error $0.05$. A narrow confidence interval indicates greater precision for the stated statistical model, rather than a guarantee that its assumptions describe the experiment correctly.

Once $x$ is observed, $C(x)$ either contains the fixed target or does not. The 95% statement concerns the random procedure $C(X)$, not a posterior probability of 0.95 that this particular interval contains $\theta$. A credible interval instead assigns specified posterior probability to a region under Bayesian inference. These interpretations can differ even when the numerical endpoints agree. The repeated-sampling interpretation is explained in NIST's confidence-limits teaching reference.

Jerzy Neyman's 1937 paper formulates the fixed-target, random-endpoint construction in Section II, especially equation (20) on page 348. Its confidence coefficient must hold across the allowed statistical parameters, rather than only at the value suggested by one sample. See Neyman, Outline of a Theory of Statistical Estimation Based on the Classical Theory of Probability and the original paper scan.

A credible interval is an interval $C(d)$ containing a prescribed amount $1-\alpha$ of posterior probability for an unknown scalar statistical parameter $\Theta$. For a continuous posterior distribution with posterior density $p(\theta \mid d)$, its endpoints satisfyThe conditioning includes the chosen statistical model and prior distribution. For a discrete posterior distribution, exact equality may be impossible because of its probability masses; an interval can instead be required to contain at least the requested posterior probability. An interval compresses the full posterior distribution into a range whose uncertainty can be communicated in the parameter's own units. See MIT 18.05, Class 16: probability intervals.

For the eight-head, two-tail example in Bayesian statistics, the posterior density is $2860{\theta }^9(1-\theta {)}^3$ on $[0,1]$. Its cumulative distribution function, obtained by integration of this polynomial, isSolving $F(a)=0.025$ and $F(b)=0.975$ by the bisection method givesThese are numerical approximations to the exact quantiles defined by those equations; the endpoints were computed from the cumulative distribution function, rather than read off a plot. The resulting equal-tailed credible interval leaves 2.5% posterior probability on each side. Its shaded area is 95% of the total area under the posterior density.

Credible intervals are not unique. The one-sided credible interval $[0,F^{-1}(0.95)]\approx [0,0.887334219]$ also has 95% posterior probability, but leaves all 5% outside it on the right. A highest density region instead selects points above a density threshold; it need not be an equal-tailed credible interval, and when the posterior density has separated peaks it need not be one interval at all. Thus a reported credible interval should specify its construction.

A 95% credible interval makes a statement about the statistical parameter conditional on these observed data and the Bayesian model. A 95% confidence interval instead refers to the coverage probability of a procedure under repeated sampling at a fixed parameter value. These are different conditioning statements: 95% posterior probability does not by itself imply 95% coverage probability for every fixed parameter. The confidence interval article develops that sampling interpretation.

A credible set is a measurable set of parameter values containing specified posterior probability. At credibility level $1-\alpha$, it satisfies ${\int }_C\pi (\theta \mid x)d\theta =1-\alpha$ for a continuous posterior. A credible interval is a credible set that is an interval. Equal-tailed and highest-density choices add selection rules; the posterior-mass requirement alone does not make the set unique. Its probability statement is conditional on the observed data and prior model, whereas a frequentist confidence interval is interpreted through repeated-sample coverage.

In decision theory, an action is evaluated by a loss $L(\theta ,a)$ that depends on the unknown state $\theta$ and chosen action $a$. A statistical decision rule $\delta$ maps observed data $X$ to an action. Its frequentist risk isA Bayesian analysis averages this risk under a prior distribution. After observing data, a Bayes action minimizes posterior expected loss, $a\mapsto \int L(\theta ,a)\pi (d\theta \mid X)$, when a minimizer exists. For a finite classification problem with loss one for a wrong label and zero for a correct label, this chooses a label of maximum posterior probability. A different loss can rationally produce a different action from the same posterior distribution.

A minimax rule instead seeks to minimize ${\sup }_{\theta }R(\theta ,\delta )$, the worst-case risk. Specifying a loss and the information available to a rule makes the optimization problem explicit; probability calculations alone do not determine which consequences should be valued. Preference-based formulations can describe choices through expected utility under suitable consistency axioms.

In a quantum application, recovering Born rule weights from preferences requires specifying how physically equivalent games and irrelevant branch refinements affect value; it is not a consequence of decoherence alone.

For Bayesian deviance $D(\theta )=-2\log L(\theta )$ under a common likelihood convention, define $\overline{D}=\mathbb{E}[D(\theta )\mid y]$ and $p_D=\overline{D}-D(\mathbb{E}[\theta \mid y])$. Then $\mathrm{DIC}=\overline{D}+p_D$ trades average fit against effective complexity. Lower values suggest better penalized predictive fit in comparable models; differences are not Bayes factors or model posterior probabilities. The choice of stochastic parameters and latent-variable representation matters, especially in a hierarchical Bayesian model.

Hold the old statistical parameters fixed when taking the conditional expectation, while keeping the candidate statistical parameters $\theta$ variable:For independent observations in a finite mixture model, $Z_i$ is a hidden component label. Bayes' theorem gives its mixture responsibilities:These posterior probabilities are the conditional expectations of the mixture allocation indicators; they turn hidden counts into fractional counts.^[ref] They condition on a current fixed fit, rather than averaging over a posterior distribution of the statistical parameters. Taking the conditional expectation of the complete-data log-likelihood is essential: substituting a single guessed label, or merely substituting the conditional mean into a nonlinear complete-data expression, generally gives a different algorithm.

An equal-tailed credible interval uses quantiles of a continuous posterior distribution to leave posterior probability $\alpha /2$ in each tail. It is also called a central credible interval; central refers to equal tail probabilities, not equal distances from the posterior mean. For the beta distribution $\mathrm{Beta}(10,4)$ in credible interval, the 95% endpoints are approximately $0.461868461$ and $0.909079605$, whose midpoint $0.685474033$ differs from the posterior mean $5/7$.

Fano's inequality turns remaining uncertainty into a constraint on decision errors. If an observation leaves many plausible answers, a decoder cannot usually recover the answer reliably. Its elegant idea is to separate two uncertainties: whether the guess was wrong, and which alternative was correct when it was wrong.

Let $X,Y$ be discrete random variables, with $X$ taking values in a finite alphabet $\mathcal{X}$ of cardinality $M\ge 2$. Choose any deterministic decoder $\hat{X}=f(Y)$ whose output lies in $\mathcal{X}$, and define its average error probability $p_e=\mathbb{P}\{\hat{X}\ne X\}$. With base-two logarithms, Fano's inequality statesHere $H(X\mid Y)$ is conditional entropy and $h_2$ is binary entropy, with $0{\log }_{2}0=0$ at the endpoints. Both sides are measured in bits; using natural logarithms throughout gives the same inequality in nats. No uniform source, independence of $X,Y$, or optimality of the decoder is assumed. Requiring its output to belong to the same alphabet is what leaves at most $M-1$ alternatives after an error.^[ref]

For an exact toy example, give $X$ the discrete uniform distribution on $\{A,B,C,D\}$. A channel reports $Y=X$ with probability $1-q$ and reports each of the other three symbols with probability $q/3$, where $0\le q\le 1$. Use the decoder $f(y)=y$. The output is uniform, and the conditional probabilities after any report $y$ areThus $p_e=q$ and direct calculation of the conditional entropy givesThis is equality in Fano's inequality for every $q\in [0,1]$. At $q=0.3$, each report leaves probabilities $(0.7,0.1,0.1,0.1)$, up to their order, and $H(X\mid Y)\approx 1.3568$ bits. The two contributions are $h_2(0.3)\approx 0.8813$ bits for the error flag and $0.3{\log }_{2}3\approx 0.4755$ bits for identifying the correct alternative after an error. These are theoretical probabilities, not measured data.

The identity decoder in this example minimizes error only for $0\le q\le 3/4$: its guessed symbol has the largest posterior probability exactly when $1-q\ge q/3$. At $q=3/4$, $X,Y$ are independent random variables and all four guesses tie. For $q>3/4$, guessing any one of the three other symbols has error probability $1-q/3<q$. Equality in Fano's inequality therefore does not certify an optimal decoder.

For usefulness, combine $h_2(p_e)\le 1$ with ${\log }_2(M-1)\le {\log }_{2}M$ to obtain the simpler consequenceFor a uniform $X$, $H(X\mid Y)={\log }_{2}M-I(X;Y)$, so this becomes $p_e\ge \max \{0,1-(I(X;Y)+1)/{\log }_{2}M\}$. This connects mutual information to unavoidable decision error in channel coding or classification in statistical learning; it can rule out reliable recovery regardless of the chosen decoder.^[ref]

The sharper right-hand side $F_M(p)=h_2(p)+p{\log }_2(M-1)$ increases from zero to ${\log }_{2}M$ on $0\le p\le 1-1/M$, then decreases: in the interior, $F_M^{\prime }(p)={\log }_2((M-1)(1-p)/p)$. When interpreting the inequality by inverting a curve, use its increasing branch to obtain a lower error threshold. A decoder that chooses a largest posterior probability, as in maximum a posteriori decoding, always has $p_e\le 1-1/M$, since the largest of $M$ conditional probabilities is at least $1/M$. Arbitrary decoders can have larger error. In particular, low conditional entropy does not force every decoder to work well: with a fair binary $X$ and $Y=X$, the rule $f(Y)=1-Y$ has $p_e=1$ even though $H(X\mid Y)=0$. Fano's inequality supplies a constraint, not an exact error prediction for each rule.

The Felsenstein pruning algorithm computes a site likelihood function by sum-product belief propagation from leaves to root. For a finite-state Markov kernel $K$, the subtree likelihood function obeys $L_v(a)={\prod }_{w\text{ child of }v}{\sum }_{b}K(a,b)L_w(b)$, with observed-state indicators at leaves. Summing against the root probability distribution gives the site likelihood function. An outward pass gives edge posterior probabilities and expected transition counts for the expectation-maximization algorithm.

Fix $r>1$ ravens and $M>1$ nonblack objects in a finite population. Under $H_0$, all ravens are black; under $H_1$, exactly one is nonblack. The total numbers $r,M$ are held fixed under both hypotheses, so the classification of one nonraven also changes between hypotheses. This is a deliberately specified model for Bayesian confirmation, not a universal rule about how bird observations supply evidence.

A uniform draw among nonblack objects returns a nonraven with probabilities $1$ under $H_0$ and $1-1/M$ under $H_1$. A uniform draw among ravens returns a black object with probabilities $1$ and $1-1/r$. The respective likelihood ratios for $H_0$ over $H_1$ are therefore $(1-1/M{)}^{-1}$ and $(1-1/r{)}^{-1}$. When $M>r$, the former is closer to one, so supplies less support under these assumptions.

With equal prior probabilities, Bayes' theorem gives posterior probabilities $1/(2-1/M)$ and $1/(2-1/r)$. More generally, with prior probability $p$ for $H_0$, replace the two expressions by $p/[p+(1-p)(1-1/M)]$ and $p/[p+(1-p)(1-1/r)]$. Previously known information or a different sampling protocol requires different likelihoods; selecting an object already known to be a nonraven need not supply new evidence.

Take independent proper normal prior distributions for the two segment means and a proper inverse-gamma distribution for the common variance. A uniform prior distribution over $m=1,\dots ,n$ may then retain the empty second segment. The posterior distribution is proper: its likelihood function is bounded above by $(2\pi {)}^{-n/2}{v}^{-n/2}$, whose integral against $\mathrm{IG}(a_0,b_0)$ is finite for $a_0,b_0>0$. At $m=n$ the second mean has its unchanged proper prior distribution as its full conditional distribution. The configuration's posterior probability now has the meaningful interpretation of no change inside the observed sample.

A Hidden Markov model combines an unobserved Markov chain $Z_1,\dots ,Z_T$ with observations $O_1,\dots ,O_T$. Given the whole hidden-state path, the observations have conditional independence, and the conditional distribution of $O_t$ depends only on $Z_t$. The state-transition assumption and this emission assumption are separate parts of the model.^[ref]

For a time-homogeneous model with a finite hidden state space and discrete observations, write ${\pi }_i=P(Z_1=i)$, $a_{ij}=P(Z_{t+1}=j\mid Z_t=i)$ and $b_i(o)=P(O_t=o\mid Z_t=i)$ for the emission probabilities. The joint probability mass function factors asFor continuous observations, appropriate probability density functions replace the emission probability mass functions.

For example, a hidden state can describe whether a machine is working normally or has a fault, while a noisy sensor emits a positive or negative signal. Both states may emit a positive signal, with different probabilities; one observation therefore need not identify the state. Summing the factorization over hidden paths gives the observation likelihood. The forward algorithm reuses partial sums to compute it, and the backward algorithm helps infer hidden-state posterior probabilities. The observations alone need not satisfy the Markov property.

A highest posterior density interval is a credible interval whose included points have at least as high posterior density as excluded points, apart from boundary and null-set choices. It is a highest density region of prescribed posterior probability that happens to be an interval. For a continuous unimodal posterior with two interior endpoints, the endpoint densities agree. A monotone posterior on a half-line instead starts at a support boundary, as in a Pareto highest density interval. For a multimodal posterior distribution, the highest-density region can be disconnected and cannot always be represented by a single interval. Density-level regions use a specified parameter coordinate and reference measure; they are not generally preserved by nonlinear reparametrization.