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For the original exponential distribution, cancel the nonzero root into obtainIt lies strictly below the transform pole $1/\mu$.

With the extra expenses, the insurer's payment per claim is $Y=X+A$, where $A$ has exponential distribution of expected value $\mu /2$ and is independent of $X$. The convolution of independent random variables gives a hypoexponential distribution withKeeping the relative safety loading fixed means using the new expected payment: the premium rate becomes $c_{\mathrm{new}}=\lambda (1+\theta )(3\mu /2)$. It does not mean keeping the old premium rate fixed. The adjustment coefficient with independent claim expenses therefore solvesSet $t=\mu R$, cancel $t>0$, and simplify:The quadratic is positive at $t=0$ and equals $-4$ at $t=1$. Its leading coefficient is positive, so the smaller root is in $(0,1)$ and the larger root exceeds $1$. Only the smaller root lies in the finite moment-generating function domain. HenceFor $\theta =1$,Thus the new adjustment coefficient is about $9.72\%$ smaller, even though the premium rate has been increased to retain the same relative safety loading. The Lundberg inequality consequently has a slower exponential decay rate as a function of capital.

For independent and identically distributed random variables sampled from a probability density function $f$, a kernel density estimator with kernel for density estimation $K$ and smoothing bandwidth $h>0$ isThe usual kernel for density estimation is nonnegative; finite $\int K^2$ makes the integrated variance finite. The mean integrated squared error and its bias-variance decomposition of mean squared error areThe interchange is justified by the Tonelli theorem.

For the exponential distribution and the specified unit-width uniform kernel, put $g_h(x)=\mathbb{E}{\hat{f}}_h(x)$. The expected value is $h^{-1}\mathbb{P}\{x-h/2\le X\le x+h/2\}$. Intersecting this interval with the positive half-line givesOn $[-h/4,0)$ the true probability density function vanishes, whereasHere $1-e^{-z}\ge z/2$ for $0\le z\le 1/4$. This leakage across the support boundary proves the integrated squared bias from a density jump:In particular, $h_0=1$ and $c=1/256$ suffice. The phenomenon differs from a smooth interior bias of a kernel density estimator: the order-one boundary error persists over a region of width proportional to $h$.

By independence, $\mathrm{Var}({\hat{f}}_h(x))=n^{-1}\{\mathbb{E}{K}_h(x-X{)}^2-g_h(x{)}^2\}$. Integrating the first term and using $\int K^2=1$ yieldsAlso $I(h)\le \int f^2=1/2$: the kernel density estimator mean is an average of translates of $f$, so the Jensen inequality followed by the Tonelli theorem bounds its squared integral.

To optimize over every $h>0$, we must establish that useful smoothing bandwidths approach zero, rather than optimize only a formal small-$h$ expression. An exact calculation supplies that justification. The autocorrelation integral of the exponential distribution density isAveraging over the two uniform windows, or integrating the piecewise expression for $g_h$, givesThese formulas show that $B$ is continuous on $(0,\infty )$, is strictly positive there because $g_h>0$ on $(-h/2,0)$, and tends to $1/2$ as $h\to \infty$. Consequently, $B$ is bounded away from zero on $[\delta ,\infty )$ for every $\delta >0$. Its expansion agrees with the supplied $B(h)=h/12+o(h)$.

The choice $h_n=\sqrt{12/n}$ givesChoose smoothing bandwidths within $1/n$ of the infimum. Their mean integrated squared error tends to zero, and nonnegativity of the integrated variance gives $B(h_n)\to 0$, hence $h_n\to 0$. For any $\epsilon \in (0,1/12)$, eventuallyThe last step is the arithmetic-geometric mean inequality. Taking the lower limit and then $\epsilon \downarrow 0$ matches the upper bound. ThusThe original PDF has this constant; the TeX aid's $1/\sqrt{2}$ is a transcription error.

For a binomial distribution, the score function isIts squared expected value is $I(\theta )=n/[\theta (1-\theta )]$, using the binomial distribution variance $n\theta (1-\theta )$. Hence the Jeffreys prior isthe Beta distribution $\mathrm{Beta}(1/2,1/2)$. The factor $\sqrt{n}$ is independent of $\theta$ and disappears on normalization.

Start with the Beta distribution draw in the Beta-binomial exchangeable coupling. Write $s=\alpha +\beta$ andThese are the expected value and variance of $p_M$. The fixed $n$ in this coupling is a dependence parameter chosen by the investigator, not necessarily the observed number of cups. The four numbered stages together address the single printed correlation request.

The next Beta distribution has conditional expected value and varianceFor large $n$, its expected value approaches $X/n$, while its variance is at most $1/[4(s+n+1)]$. The final draw therefore stays close to the first. These are prior distributions for the cup probabilities: the auxiliary count is a device for constructing dependence, rather than additional observed tea data.

Using the conditional Beta distribution expected value and the law of iterated expectation,Equality of the expected values alone does not prove equality of the marginal distributions; the later exchangeability argument does.

Let $w_m=w(m/n)$, so a type $v$ values a prize at $v{w}_m$. In a symmetric increasing Bayes-Nash equilibrium of this rank-order contest, a player reporting type $t$ wins when at most $m-1$ opponents have larger types. Its winning probability isHere the count of opponents above $t$ has a binomial distribution. Differentiation, or the associated order statistic density, givesDefine the effort by the all-pay effort identityThis also verifies equilibrium globally. The derivative of a type $v$'s payoff from reporting $t$ is $w_m(v-t)q_m^{\prime }(t)$, positive before $v$ and negative after $v$. Thus truthful reporting is a best response. Bidding above the maximal equilibrium effort gains no additional winning probability. Type zero chooses zero effort.

By exchanging the two integrations, the expected value of total effort isThe last integral is the moment $\mathbb{E}[X(1-X)]$ for a Beta distribution with parameters $n-m$ and $m$, namely $m(n-m)/(n(n+1))$. This is the uniform-value multi-prize all-pay effort formula.

Put $x=m/n$ and $h(x)=w(x)x(1-x)$. The positive constant $n^2/(n+1)$ multiplying $h(x)$ does not affect the maximizing $m$. Sincethe assumed inequality makes $h$ nonincreasing on the feasible interval. Hence one prize maximizes expected total effort.

For the power family, the PDF gives $w(x)=x^{-\alpha }$. ThenIf $\alpha \ge 1$, this derivative is strictly negative for $0<x<1$: the bracket is affine and its values at the endpoints are $1-\alpha \le 0$ and $-1$. Thus $m=1$ is optimal.

If $0<\alpha <1$, the unique continuous maximizer isThe objective strictly increases before $x_{\ast }$ and decreases after it. Therefore its discrete maximizer lies amongCompare the surviving candidates using $m^{1-\alpha }(n-m)$, since $R_m=n^{\alpha }{m}^{1-\alpha }(n-m)/(n+1)$. If $n{x}_{\ast }$ is an integer, that integer is the unique maximizer; if its floor is zero, the only feasible candidate is $1$. This proves the discrete prize-count optimization for a power-valued contest including the endpoint cases.

The sufficient condition need only hold on $[1/n,(n-1)/n]$. The power family is undefined at zero, so the printed endpoint $x=0$ cannot apply to it. More generally, a positive finite value $w(0)$ would make the displayed inequality fail at zero. The design argument uses only positive feasible prize fractions and needs no value there.

We derive the probabilities for a sequential elimination all-pay contest from a discounted subgame perfect equilibrium, using backward induction, and only then take $\delta \uparrow 1$. This preserves the selection supplied by discounting.

First consider a two-player all-pay auction with effective prizes $A_1\ge A_2>0$, so the incremental payoff is $A_i$ times winning probability minus effort. For $0\le b\le A_2$, the independent mixed strategies have effort cumulative distribution functionsThe second player has an atom $1-A_2/A_1$ at zero. For positive bids on this support, the first player's payoff is $A_1{G}_2(b)-b=A_1-A_2$ and the second's is $A_2{G}_1(b)-b=0$. Bids above $A_2$ cannot improve either payoff. The first has no zero atom, so the second's zero bid also earns zero. If the first deviates to zero, it can win only when the second bids zero; even with every such tie resolved in its favor, its payoff is at most $A_1(1-A_2/A_1)=A_1-A_2$. The two-player complete-information all-pay equilibrium therefore has winning probabilitiesThese follow by integrating $G_2$ against the uniform $G_1$. A third player with effective prize at most $A_2$ cannot profit by entering: for $0<b\le A_2$, its winning probability is $G_1(b)G_2(b)\le b/A_2$, giving payoff at most zero; above $A_2$ its effort exceeds its prize.

For the dynamic induction, relabel any remaining subgame's valuations as $v_1>\cdots >v_k$, with $r<k$ prizes left. Define the backward-induction threshold in an elimination all-pay contestFor $r=1$ the sum is empty and $C_1=v_2$. The discounted continuation value in an elimination contest is obtained from the following net utilities:The base case is the one-prize all-pay auction: only the two highest valuations need positive effort, with prizes $v_1,v_2$ and payoffs $v_1-v_2,0$. Every lower player has a nonprofitable deviation by the preceding calculation.

For $r\ge 2$, if either of the top two wins, the other becomes the highest player in a subgame with $r-1$ prizes. The continuation threshold in either such subgame is the same numberThe remaining top player's continuation payoff is $v_i-D$. Its effective prize in a sequential contest, net of the discounted payoff from losing, is thereforeThus $A_1>A_2$ for $\delta <1$, and the two-player distributions above apply. Adding the losing-state baselines giveswhich agree with the proposed formulas.

For a player of rank $i\ge 3$, the inductive continuation utility after either top player wins is identical: its new rank is $i-1$, and the utility expression depends only on its own value and the lower-valued tail. Thus its current zero-effort payoff is that common continuation value multiplied by $\delta$, exactly the stated $J_i$. Its effective prize for deviating to win now is $A_i=v_i-J_i$. For $3\le i\le r$, direct subtraction givesFor $i\ge r+1$, $A_i=v_i\le v_{r+1}\le C_r$, since the coefficients in $C_r$ are nonnegative and sum to one. Such a player cannot gain by entering against the two active players. There is one additional zero-bid deviation to check for the highest player. If both active bids become zero, the tie could award a prize to any remaining player. Losing to any player below rank $2$ gives no greater continuation utility than losing to rank $2$: deleting rank $2$ makes the ordered remaining rival list componentwise smallest, and its continuation threshold is a nonnegative weighted sum of that list. Thus even resolving every all-zero tie in the highest player's favor gives payoff at most its usual losing baseline plus $A_1(1-A_2/A_1)=A_1-A_2$. No tie rule can improve this deviation. This verifies all best responses and the continuation-utility formulas. Applying the construction to every remaining-player set proves a subgame perfect equilibrium of the discounted contest, not merely an on-path prescription.

Now take the vanishing-discount limit of an elimination all-pay contest. At every nonfinal subgame,Thus the two highest remaining players win with equal probabilities in a nonfinal stage. In the final stage the effective prizes are their actual valuations, so its lower-valued participant beats the higher one with probability equal to half their valuation ratio.

Return to the original ranks. Only the original top $m+1$ can ever win; at most $m-1$ higher players can have left before the final stage, so players of rank $m+2$ or worse never enter its top pair. Player $1$ must lose $m-1$ fair nonfinal contests to remain unawarded until the final stage, where its opponent has value $v_{m+1}$. HenceA player $2\le i\le m$ first enters the top pair at stage $i-1$, after $i-2$ higher-ranked winners have left. To remain unawarded, it must lose the $m-i+1$ nonfinal contests from then on, followed by the final contest against rank $m+1$. ThereforeThere are exactly $m$ distinct winners, so the expected value of their indicator sum is $m$. Combining these calculations givesThis proves the ranked winning probabilities in an undiscounted elimination contest. When $m=1$, it reduces to the ordinary two-player all-pay winning probabilities; when $m>1$, the repeated fair stages explain each power of $1/2$.

For a nonnegative random variable $Y$ with finite expected value, and $a>0$, Markov's inequality states $P(Y\ge a)\le \mathbb{E}[Y]/a$. Indeed $Y\ge a{1}_{\{Y\ge a\}}$, and taking expected values proves the bound. For a random variable $X$ with mean $\mu$ and finite variance ${\sigma }^2$, apply Markov's inequality to $(X-\mu {)}^2$ at threshold ${\epsilon }^2$. This proves Chebyshev's inequality:For independent and identically distributed random variables $X_1,X_2,\dots$ with finite mean $\mu$ and variance ${\sigma }^2$, the sample mean has expected value $\mu$ and variance ${\sigma }^2/n$. ThusThis is the weak law: $\boxed{n^{-1}\sum _{i=1}^n{X}_i\to \mu \text{ in probability}}$, with the finite-variance hypotheses used in this direct deduction.

The more general weak law of large numbers needs only $\mathbb{E}|X_1|<\infty$. To obtain that version, truncate $Y_i^{(K)}=X_i{1}_{\{|X_i|\le K\}}$. For fixed $K$ the bounded variables obey the result just proved. Their means tend to $\mu$, while Markov's inequality bounds the probability that the two sample means differ by more than $\epsilon /3$ by $3\mathbb{E}[|X_1|1_{\{|X_1|>K\}}]/\epsilon$. First take $n\to \infty$ and then $K\to \infty$; the integrable tail vanishes, proving the full integrable i.i.d. version as well.

Finally assume $\mathbb{E}[X]=0$ and $\mathrm{Var}(X)={\sigma }^2$. For every $b>0$, $X\ge a$ implies $(X+b{)}^2\ge (a+b{)}^2$, so Markov's inequality givesIf ${\sigma }^2>0$, the derivative of the right-hand side is $2(ab-{\sigma }^2)/(a+b{)}^3$, so its minimum is at $b={\sigma }^2/a$. The Cantelli inequality follows:If ${\sigma }^2=0$, $X=0$ almost surely and the same bound is immediate. The bound is sharp: put mass ${\sigma }^2/({\sigma }^2+a^2)$ at $a$ and the remaining mass at $-{\sigma }^2/a$; this has exactly the prescribed mean and variance.

Let $N=a+b$ and measure Lionel's fortune in unit stakes. This is gambler's ruin: the fortune moves by $+1$ with probability $p$ and $-1$ with probability $q$, stopping at $0$ or $N$. Let $m_i$ be the expected value of the absorption time starting at $i$. It is finite: from any interior state, a run of $N$ wins or losses has a fixed positive probability of absorption within $N$ steps, giving a geometric bound on survival over successive blocks. First-step analysis therefore givesFor $p\ne q$, the homogeneous solution of the recurrence is $A+B(q/p{)}^i$, and a particular solution is $-i/(p-q)$. Put $\rho =q/p$. Imposing the two endpoint boundary conditions gives the expected duration of biased gambler's ruinConsequently the expected number of games isThe denominator and numerator have matching signs, so this is positive. As a check its continuous limit at $p=q=1/2$ is $ab$, the expected duration of symmetric gambler's ruin.

For the exponential distribution with expected value $\mu$,The Poisson distribution has both expected value and variance equal to $\lambda$. Substitution into the random sum of independent claims formulas gives the portfolio A moments

To distinguish the random intensity from its possible values, write it as $\Lambda$. Its law is a gamma distribution with shape $2$ and rate $p/q$. HenceFor the Poisson mixture, conditional expectation and conditional variance both equal $\Lambda$. The law of total expectation and the law of total variance yieldwhere $p+q=1$. Applying the random sum of independent claims formulas with the exponential distribution of the claim sizes gives the portfolio B momentsAt the matched intensity ${\lambda }_0$, the expected value for portfolio A is also $2q\mu /p$, whereas its variance is $4q{\mu }^2/p$. Thus the expected totals agree, but mixing increases the variance:The extra term is precisely ${\mu }^2\mathrm{Var}(\Lambda )$.

Conditioning on the intensity in the Poisson mixture givesThus $N$ has the negative binomial distribution with two successes and success probability $p$, counting failures; explicitly $\mathbb{P}(N=j)=(j+1)p^2{q}^j$ for $j\ge 0$. The probability generating function is finite for real $z<1/q$.

The claim-size moment-generating function is $M_X(t)=(1-\mu t{)}^{-1}$. Substituting into the aggregate moment-generating function and using $p+q=1$ givesPut $L(t)=p/(p-\mu t)$, the moment-generating function of an exponential distribution with rate $p/\mu$. The identitythen yieldsThe gamma-mixed Poisson aggregate with exponential claims has three nonnegative mixture weights summing to one. By uniqueness of the moment-generating function near zero, the aggregate distribution isHere ${\delta }_0$ is the Dirac measure at zero. In particular $\mathbb{P}(S=0)=p^2$, consistently with $\mathbb{P}(N=0)$. The positive components have respective expected values $\mu /p$ and $2\mu /p$; their mixture distribution accounts for the possibility of no aggregate payout.

The expected value and variance under quota share reinsurance follow by scaling the exponential distribution:The retained stop loss moments for an exponential aggregate follow from the payout $Y=\min (S,M)$, its survival function equals $e^{-x/{\mu }_S}$ for $0\le x<M$ and zero for $x\ge M$. The tail integral formula for moments gives, with $m=M/{\mu }_S$ and $r=e^{-m}$,Consequently the retained moments areMatching the two expected values forces $\alpha =1-r$, which lies strictly between zero and one. The difference of the variances simplifies toIndeed $h(m)=m-1+e^{-m}$ has $h(0)=0$ and $h^{\prime }(m)=1-e^{-m}\ge 0$ for $m\ge 0$. Because $M>0$, the difference is actually positive. At equal retained expected value, aggregate stop loss reinsurance reduces the variance more than quota share reinsurance.